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REVIEW ESSAY
“Plucking the Mask of Mystery from Its Face”:
Jurisprudence and H.L.A. Hart
A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM. By Nicola
Lacey. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2004. Pp. xxii, 422. $35.00
JOHN MIKHAIL*
[J]urisprudence trembles so uncertainly on the margin of many subjects that
there will always be the need for someone, in Bentham’s phrase, to “pluck the
mask of Mystery” from its face.1
Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, or H.L.A. Hart as he is commonly known, is
widely held to be one of the greatest legal philosophers of the twentieth century.
Many would disagree, insisting that Hart is the greatest, without qualification.2
However that may be, there is little doubt that Hart’s work has had a powerful
impact on the fields of jurisprudence and legal philosophy throughout the
English-speaking world and beyond. Hart was Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford
University from 1952 to 1968, and the books and articles he published during
this period, including Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,3
Causation in the Law (with A.M. Honore´),4 The Concept of Law,5 Law, Liberty,
* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. © 2007, John Mikhail. I wish to thank
Randy Barnett, Norman Birnbaum, Steve Goldberg, Elisa Hurley, Erin Kidwell, Greg Klass, Mark
Lance, Judy Lichtenberg, David Luban, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mark Murphy, Les Orsy, Gary Peller,
Madison Powers, Henry Richardson, Mike Seidman, Nancy Sherman, and Robin West for stimulating
conversations on various aspects of this Essay. Thanks also to the staff of the Georgetown law libraries;
the students in my Law and Philosophy and Law, Cognitive Science, and Human Rights seminars; and
the editors of The Georgetown Law Journal, especially Lindsay Amstutz, Brendon DeMay, Dustin
Kenall, Charles Kim, and Martin Hewett. Brendon DeMay and Charles Kim went beyond the call of
duty, and I thank them for their exceptional diligence.
1. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594
(1958), reprinted in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 49 (1983) [hereinafter
ESSAYS].
2. Opinions differ, and some would probably give the nod to the Austrian jurist, Hans Kelsen. But
most scholars would agree that Hart and Kelsen are the century’s two greatest legal philosophers. See,
e.g., Brian Leiter, The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century, 36 RUTGERS L.J.
165, 168 (2005) (describing Kelsen and Hart as “the two dominant figures in twentieth-century legal
philosophy”); John Gardner, Book Review, 121 LAW Q. REV. 329, 333 (2005) (reviewing NICOLA
LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM (2004)) (affirming that “only
Hans Kelsen seriously challenges Hart’s claim to be the most important legal philosopher of the
twentieth century”).
3. Hart, supra note 1.
4. H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORE´, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985).
5. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
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and Morality,6 and Punishment and Responsibility,7 set a standard of excellence
and influence that few are likely to rival. Other important legal scholars have
occupied the prestigious Oxford chair, including Henry Maine (1869–1883),
Frederick Pollock (1883–1903), Paul Vinogradoff (1903–1926), and Hart’s
successor, Ronald Dworkin (1969–1998), but, with the possible exception of
Dworkin, none have been more influential than Hart.
Until recently, little was known of Hart’s private life. That has now changed
with the publication of Nicola Lacey’s A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare
and the Noble Dream.8 Drawing on a wealth of material, including Hart’s
diaries, correspondence, and personal papers, as well as interviews with his
family, friends, former students, and colleagues, Lacey paints a warm, sensitive,
and highly revealing portrait of the man she calls “quite simply, the pre-eminent
English-speaking legal philosopher of the twentieth century.”9 The book is a
valuable source of information on Hart’s life and scholarly career, and a
wonderful complement to the numerous book-length assessments of his work
that have already been published.10
Lacey is Professor of Criminal Law and Legal Theory at the London School
of Economics and a notable legal theorist in her own right, particularly in the
fields of criminal law theory and feminist jurisprudence.11 She brings to her task
not only a deep familiarity with Hart’s scholarship and the literature it has
generated, but also a personal acquaintance with Hart himself. Lacey met Hart
in 1979, when she was a twenty-one-year-old graduate student and he was a
seventy-two-year-old professor emeritus.12 She eventually became close with
Hart and his family, initially because her first husband was a musician who gave
lessons to Hart’s disabled son, and later through her own appointment as an
6. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963).
7. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1968).
8. LACEY, supra note 2.
9. Id. at 1.
10. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. BAYLES, HART’S LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: AN EXAMINATION (1992); ERIC J. BOOS,
PERSPECTIVES IN JURISPRUDENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF H.L.A. HART’S LEGAL THEORY (1998); NEIL MACCOR-
MICK, H.L.A. HART (1981); MICHAEL MARTIN, THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF H.L.A. HART: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL (1987); ROBERT N. MOLES, DEFINITION AND RULE IN LEGAL THEORY: A REASSESSMENT OF H.L.A.
HART AND THE POSITIVIST TRADITION (1987); DANIEL W. SKUBIK, AT THE INTERSECTION OF LEGALITY AND
MORALITY: HARTIAN LAW AS NATURAL LAW (1990); see also ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY:
THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987); LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART (P.M.S. Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977); HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE
POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Jules Coleman ed., 2001) (hereinafter HART’S POSTSCRIPT); THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF ORTHODOXY: QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY ESSAYS ON H.L.A. HART (Philip Leith & Peter
Ingram eds., 1988).
11. See, e.g., NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES (1988);
Nicola Lacey, Feminist Legal Theories and the Rights of Women, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 13
(Karen Knop ed., 2004); Nicola Lacey, Penal Theory and Penal Practice: A Communitarian Approach,
in THE USE OF PUNISHMENT 175 (Sea´n McConville ed., 2003); Nicola Lacey, Feminist Perspectives on
Ethical Positivism, in JUDICIAL POWER, DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL POSITIVISM 89 (Tom Campbell & Jeffrey
Goldsworthy eds., 2000).
12. LACEY, supra note 2, at xvii; G. Edward White, Getting Close to H.L.A. Hart, 29 MELB. U. L.
REV. 317, 318 (2005) (reviewing LACEY, supra note 2).
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Oxford Law Fellow. In a “Biographer’s Note on Approach and Sources,” Lacey
observes that her personal relationship with Hart “was of tremendous help in
writing this book” and made it natural for her “to write and think of Herbert
Hart as ‘Herbert.’”13 Because of this, and her desire “to bring alive on the page
the complicated, very human man whom so many readers of his academic work
think of as the impersonal icon, H.L.A. Hart,”14 Lacey refers to Hart by his first
name throughout the text. This practice has drawn criticism from some review-
ers,15 but on balance it probably enables Lacey to achieve the “enviably humane
and affectionate touch” for which she has been rightly praised.16
A Life of H.L.A. Hart has sensational aspects, particularly the revelations
featured prominently on the front flap17 and back cover18 of the hardcover
edition that “behind his public success, Hart struggled with demons,” including
his “Jewish background, ambivalent sexuality, and unconventional marriage”—
all of which “contributed to a profound insecurity” that, with “allegations of
espionage,” “nearly destroyed him.” Partly as a result of these revelations, but
also due to its intrinsic interest, Lacey’s book has attracted widespread attention,
and reviews of it have already appeared in the Harvard Law Review,19 Michi-
gan Law Review,20 Texas Law Review,21 and Law Quarterly Review,22 as well
as popular publications such as the London Review of Books23 and Times
Literary Supplement.24
As one might expect, reviewers have used the occasion to pursue a variety of
themes, reflecting a broad range of academic interests. Thus Michael Kirby,
Justice of the High Court of Australia and former student of Hart’s jurispruden-
13. LACEY, supra note 2, at xvii.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Central Questions, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Feb. 3, 2005, at 13
(objecting that Lacey “refers to [Hart] jarringly as ‘Herbert’ throughout, even when discussing his
relations to other thinkers who are referred to by their last names”); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Beautiful
Dreamer: A Review of Nicola Lacey’s A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 77
U. COLO. L. REV. 803, 807 n.14 (2006) (“[G]iven Hart’s extreme sense of propriety, the use of his
surname, like a hospital smock, might have better preserved his modesty during the intimate examina-
tion to which he is submitted.”).
16. Gardner, supra note 2.
17. “Nicola Lacey draws on Hart’s previously unpublished diaries and letters to reveal a complex
inner life. Outwardly successful, Hart was tormented by doubts about his intellectual abilities, his
sexual identity, and his capacity to form close relationships.”
18. “To generations of lawyers, H.L.A. Hart is known as the twentieth century’s greatest legal
philosopher . . . . But behind his public success, Hart struggled with demons. His Jewish background,
ambivalent sexuality, and unconventional marriage all contributed to a profound insecurity; allegations
of espionage, though immediately quashed, nearly destroyed him. Nicola Lacey’s biography explores
the forces that shaped an extraordinary life.”
19. Frederick Schauer, (Re)Taking Hart, 119 HARV. L. REV. 852 (2006).
20. A.W.B. Simpson, Herbert Hart Elucidated, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1437 (2006).
21. Ian P. Farrell, H.L.A. Hart and the Methodology of Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 983 (2006).
22. Gardner, supra note 2.
23. Thomas Nagel, The Central Questions, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Feb. 3, 2005, at 12.
24. A.W.B. Simpson, Stag-hunter and Mole, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (London), Feb. 11, 2005, at
6.
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tial “rival,” Julius Stone, examines Hart’s relationship with Stone, their respec-
tive influence in England and Australia, and their contrasting approaches to law,
jurisprudence, Judaism, and Zionism;25 A.W.B. Simpson, Hart’s former col-
league and a noteworthy critic of The Concept of Law from a common law
perspective,26 provides a candid recollection of Hart and his impact on the
Oxford legal community;27 G. Edward White, author of biographies of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.28 and Earl Warren,29 addresses the challenge of writing a
biography of a famous academic whose family grants the biographer special
access to the subject’s private papers without being unduly affected by this
special access;30 Frederick Schauer, a prominent legal philosopher working
within the analytical tradition, attempts to reclaim some neglected aspects of
Hart’s jurisprudence;31 while John Gardner, the current holder of the Oxford
Chair, discusses Hart’s philosophical influences, particularly J.L. Austin and
Ludwig Wittgenstein.32
This Essay likewise traces an individualistic path, by examining a limited
number of Hart’s ideas and Lacey’s interpretation of them from the perspective
of my own interests in the contemporary cognitive sciences and their implica-
tions for jurisprudence and legal theory. The central argument I make is that
while Lacey deserves considerable praise for her lucid and compelling account
of Hart’s life and career, her exploration of his jurisprudential ideas and their
roots in analytic philosophy lacks a sufficiently broad intellectual compass.
Linguistics, psychology, and the philosophy of language and mind are much
different today than they were in the 1940s and 1950s, yet Lacey does not
discuss how such familiar events as the overthrow of logical positivism, the
demise of behaviorism, the rise of generative linguistics, or the broader cogni-
tive revolution33 of which they were a part actually impacted Hart or should
influence our understanding of his legacy. Surprisingly, none of these develop-
ments are taken up in this book, leading one to ponder the significance of their
absence.
25. Michael Kirby, H.L.A. Hart, Julius Stone, and the Struggle for the Soul of Law, 27 SIDNEY L.
REV. 323, 336 (2005) (reviewing LACEY, supra note 2).
26. See A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
(SECOND SERIES) 77 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973).
27. Simpson, supra note 20.
28. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF (1993);
G. EDWARD WHITE, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (2006).
29. G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE (1982).
30. White, supra note 12, at 317.
31. Schauer, supra note 19. Schauer’s review has since received a series of replies in the new
Harvard Law Review Forum. See Ronald Dworkin, Hart and the Concepts of Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. F.
95 (2006), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/119/jan06/dworkin.pdf; David Dyzenhaus,
The Demise of Legal Positivism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 112 (2006), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/
forum/issues/119/jan06/dyzenhaus.pdf; William Twining, Schauer on Hart, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 122
(2006), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/119/jan06/twining.pdf.
32. See Gardner, supra note 2, at 330.
33. See generally HOWARD GARDNER, THE MIND’S NEW SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE COGNITIVE
REVOLUTION (1987).
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Although A Life of H.L.A. Hart is an intellectual biography, Lacey disclaims
any attempt to provide an extended analysis of Hart’s legacy.34 Her book is
therefore unlike some other notable monographs of the same general type which
have appeared recently, such as Bart Schultz’s biography of Henry Sidgwick,35
Neil Duxbury’s volume on Frederick Pollock,36 or, somewhat further afield,
Richard Burkhardt’s study of Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen,37 the founders
of modern ethology, all of which critically evaluate their subjects’ academic and
professional accomplishments within broad intellectual parameters. That A Life
of H.L.A. Hart does not do so is disappointing, but by no means fatal; on the
contrary, Lacey’s biography is a magnificent achievement within the confines
she sets for herself. However, it does suggest that an important gap remains in
our understanding of Hart and his place in the recent history of ideas. Even after
the appearance of Lacey’s marvelous book, we lack a proper overall assessment
of Hart’s contributions to the philosophy of law, the most definitive of which
was published over twenty-five years ago.38 This Essay therefore attempts to
take an initial step in that direction, by examining a few select themes of Hart’s
legal philosophy and Lacey’s interpretation of them in light of some recent
developments in philosophy, linguistics, cognitive science, and law.
The Essay falls into four parts. Part I offers a brief sketch of Hart’s life and
career as described by Lacey in A Life of H.L.A. Hart. Readers already familiar
with Lacey’s book may wish to skim this section or skip ahead to Part II. Part II
examines some of the major themes implicit in the book’s subtitle, The Night-
mare and the Noble Dream. At the close of Part II, I suggest that while Lacey
deserves credit for her sympathetic portrait of Hart’s complex inner life, she
leaves unexplored some basic questions about Hart’s jurisprudence and its
connection to wider intellectual currents such as the modern revival of Univer-
sal Grammar and the broader cognitive revolution it helped inspire, along with
the contemporaneous human rights revolution in constitutional and international
law.
In Part III, which along with Part IV is the most substantial part of the Essay,
I argue that one of the intriguing mysteries surrounding Hart’s intellectual
biography is his attitude toward these developments, which were already begin-
ning to swirl around him during the period in which he occupied the Oxford
Chair. Surprisingly, Hart wrote very little on these topics, despite having many
opportunities to do so. Finally, in Part IV, I attempt to explain this puzzling state
of affairs. Drawing on aspects of Hart’s biography which Lacey brings to light, I
34. LACEY, supra note 2, at xxii.
35. BART SCHULTZ, HENRY SIDGWICK: EYE OF THE UNIVERSE: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY (2004).
36. NEIL DUXBURY, FREDERICK POLLOCK AND THE ENGLISH JURISTIC TRADITION (2004). Duxbury resists
calling his book an “intellectual biography,” id. at xi, but this distinction is immaterial to the point I am
making.
37. RICHARD W. BURKHARDT, JR., PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR: KONRAD LORENZ, NIKO TINBERGEN, AND THE
FOUNDING OF ETHOLOGY (2005).
38. See MACCORMICK, supra note 10.
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identify some of the factors which may have caused Hart to remain unaffected
by these movements, despite their relevance to the theoretical traditions with
which he was associated. I also attempt to put Hart’s contributions to legal
philosophy in proper perspective in light of these considerations.
I.
A Life of H.L.A. Hart is divided into four parts. The first part (“North to
South”) consists of three relatively short chapters which trace Hart’s early
experiences as the third child of middle-class, first-generation Jewish parents of
central European origin who ran a successful clothing business in Harrogate, a
prosperous suburb in Yorkshire, England; Hart’s years as an undergraduate at
Oxford University in the late 1920s, where he studied “Greats” (i.e., classics,
ancient history, and philosophy) and became friends with many future leaders of
Great Britain; and Hart’s early professional activities as practicing barrister in
London from 1932 to 1940. The second part (“Change and Continuity”), also
divided into three chapters, centers around Hart’s relationship with Jenifer
Fischer Williams Hart, the outspoken and politically active daughter of a British
diplomat39 whom Hart met in 1936 and married in 1941; Hart’s war service in
British military intelligence; and Hart’s post-war transition from practicing
lawyer and civil servant to the life of an Oxford philosopher.
The chapter which chronicles this transitional period in Hart’s life (“Oxford
from the Other Side of the Fence”) is the book’s longest and also one of the
most interesting. It is here that Lacey begins to chart Hart’s intellectual develop-
ment and to situate him within the main philosophical currents prevalent in
England in the 1940s and 1950s, primarily the so-called ordinary language
philosophy of J.L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, and others, but also logical positivism
and the philosophy of Wittgenstein. In this chapter, Lacey also begins to explore
the insecurity and self-doubt which, paradoxically, were to plague Hart through-
out his remarkably successful career. To some degree these anxieties are
understandable: when Hart returned to Oxford in 1945 and took up a position as
a philosophy tutor, he did so after an interval of sixteen years. He was 38 years
old and armed with only an undergraduate degree in philosophy. “By the
standards of contemporary academic life, the idea that a former undergraduate
with no further academic experience should be sought out for a permanent
appointment over a decade after graduation is virtually unthinkable,”40 Lacey
observes. “Even by the standards of the 1930s and 1940s, it was extraordinary,
and a testimony to the regard in which Herbert had been held as a student.”41
39. Jenifer Hart’s father, Sir John Fischer Williams, was a prominent international lawyer who
represented the British Government on the Reparations Commission in Paris after World War I and
whose scholarship H.L.A. Hart cites in The Concept of Law. See JENIFER HART, ASK ME NO MORE: AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY, xi, 8 (1998) [hereinafter HART, ASK ME NO MORE]; HART, supra note 5, at 255–56
(citing John Fischer Williams, Sanctions Under the Covenant, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 130 (1936)).
40. LACEY, supra note 2, at 114.
41. Id.
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Still, it is surprising to discover how intellectually insecure Hart was at the time,
as illustrated by a letter he wrote to his friend, Isaiah Berlin:
What I am tremendously doubtful about is the adequacy of my abilities and
the strength of my interest in the subject . . . . My greatest misgiving (amongst
many) is about the whole linguistic approach to logic, meaning . . . semantics,
metalanguages, object-languages . . . . At present my (necessarily intermit-
tent . . .) attempts to understand this point of view only engender panic and
despair but I dimly hope that I cannot be incapable given time of understand-
ing it. The solution or dissolution of philosophical problems in this medium is
however at present incomprehensible yet terrifying to me. My main fear is
that it is the fineness and accuracy of this linguistic approach which escapes
my crude and conventional grasp and that it may be very difficult at 37 to
adjust one’s telescope to the right focus . . . . As a result of this I have pictures
of myself as a stale mumbler of the inherited doctrine, not knowing the
language used by my contemporaries (much younger) and unable to learn
it . . . .42
Hart taught philosophy at Oxford for seven years, from 1945 to 1952. During
this period he published relatively little: only three papers and two book
reviews, only two of which were directly related to law.43 When Hart’s predeces-
sor, Arthur Goodhart, resigned as Chair of Jurisprudence in 1952, it was
therefore largely on the strength of Hart’s reputation for “cleverness”44 and his
connection with Austin, Ryle, and other influential Oxford philosophers that
Hart was appointed to replace him. This raised eyebrows among the Oxford
Law Faculty, with whom Hart had enjoyed little contact. “It’s Goodhart without
the good” is how a prevailing sentiment was expressed.45 By contrast, Hart’s
appointment was a source of pride to the Oxford philosophical community,
which saw Hart as one of their own and welcomed the opportunity to extend
their influence. Lacey writes:
Quite apart from his high intellectual regard for Herbert, Austin’s thinking
was shaped by a belief that only a ‘real’ philosopher could elevate the Chair to
a level of any intellectual credibility. This is strikingly reflected in his note of
42. Id. at 115 (alteration in original).
43. See H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 171
(1949) [hereinafter Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights], reprinted in LOGIC AND LAN-
GUAGE (FIRST AND SECOND SERIES) 151 (Anthony Flew, ed., 1965); H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, 60 MIND
268 (1951) (reviewing JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (6th prtg. 1949)); see also H.L.A.
Hart, A Logician’s Fairy Tale, 60 PHIL. REV. 198 (1951); H.L.A. Hart, Is There Knowledge by
Acquaintance?, 23 ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y SUPP. VOL. 69 (1949); H.L.A. Hart, Signs and Words, 2 PHIL. Q.
59 (1952) (reviewing JOHN HOLLOWAY, LANGUAGE AND INTELLIGENCE (1951)). In addition, Hart edited
and wrote the preface to a book on Plato by Horace Joseph, one of his former teachers. See H.W.B.
JOSEPH, KNOWLEDGE AND THE GOOD IN PLATO’S REPUBLIC (1948).
44. LACEY, supra note 2, at 151.
45. See HART, ASK ME NO MORE, supra note 39, at 131; A.M Honore´, Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart
1907–1992, 84 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 295, 302 (1994).
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congratulation on Herbert’s ultimate election: ‘It is splendid to see the empire
of philosophy annex another province in this way—not to mention the good
you’re going to do them.’ One can imagine how members of the Law Faculty
must have felt about this colonization, not to mention the triumphalism with
which it was accomplished. For it was not only Austin’s letter which illus-
trated the philosophers’ sense of intellectual superiority: Magdalen Fellow
Kurt Baier found it ‘remarkable that lawyers can be so perceptive’; Richard
Braithwaite wrote from Cambridge to celebrate Herbert’s ‘infiltration, or was
it assault?’, opining that ‘Jurisprudence is quite futile unless it is treated as a
branch of philosophy. But’, he wondered, ‘will you persuade the lawyers?’;
Ryle was ‘glad for the sake of the students who want to think’.46
In short, there was “a marked difference of tone between the philosophers and
the lawyers. While the philosophers were warm and exultant, the lawyers were
merely polite.”47 There were exceptions, however; Hart’s closest friend on the
Law Faculty, A.M. Honore´, wrote an unsigned notice for a university newspaper
welcoming his appointment, while another lawyer, R.V. Heuston, wrote Hart to
say he “looked forward to Herbert providing a ‘town planning scheme’ for the
‘intellectual slum of English Jurisprudence.’”48
In retrospect, Heuston’s remark was prophetic, for Hart’s appointment be-
came a significant turning point in modern Anglo-American legal thought. Hart
revived the largely moribund discipline of English jurisprudence and restored it
to a prominent position alongside its more influential German and American
counterparts.49 Indeed, over the next several decades, Hart managed, with the
help of a talented group of students and colleagues, including Ronald Dworkin,
John Finnis, Ruth Gavison, David Lyons, Neil McCormick, Herbert Morris,
Joseph Raz, and Robert Summers, to launch a minor intellectual revolution in
the philosophy of law, which quickly spread beyond its original borders and
integrated parts of academic law and analytic philosophy in a manner now
largely taken for granted, although not without its influential critics.50
In Part Three (“The Golden Age”), which is the heart of the biography and
comprises nearly half of its 364-page narrative, Lacey describes the trajectory
of Hart’s career during this period in lush and illuminating detail. The center-
piece is a useful introduction to The Concept of Law, a book which eventually
sold over 150,000 copies and cemented Hart’s worldwide reputation.51 How-
46. LACEY, supra note 2, at 149.
47. Id. at 149–50.
48. Id. at 150.
49. See Honore´, supra note 45, at 302. See generally Neil Duxbury, English Jurisprudence Between
Austin and Hart, 91 VA. L. REV. 1 (2005) (arguing that English jurisprudence between Austin and Hart
was largely inert); W.L. Twining, Academic Law and Legal Philosophy: The Significance of H.L.A.
Hart, 95 LAW. Q. REV. 557 (1979) (same).
50. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999) (criticizing
the influence of philosophers on legal scholarship).
51. LACEY, supra note 2, at 218–19, 222–33.
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ever, Lacey also covers virtually every major event during this part of Hart’s
career, including his 1953 inaugural lecture52 and subsequent exchange with
Edgar Bodenheimer over the limits of analytic jurisprudence in the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review;53 his year-long visit to Harvard Law School in
1956–1957, which culminated in Hart’s debate with Lon Fuller over legal
positivism and natural law in the Harvard Law Review;54 Hart’s appointment in
1959 as President of the Aristotelian Society; his debate with Patrick Devlin
over the legal enforcement of sexual morality;55 Hart’s first book, Causation in
the Law, co-authored with Honore´;56 his second visit to the United States in
1961–1962, when he spent a sabbatical at U.C.L.A. and traveled to Berkeley to
debate Hans Kelsen;57 his trip to Stanford University in 1962 to deliver the
Harry Camp Lectures, which later became Law, Liberty and Morality;58 and his
first visit to Israel in 1964 to deliver the Lionel Cohen Lectures, which later
became The Morality of the Criminal Law.59
For readers of this Journal, Lacey’s chapter on Hart’s visit to Harvard Law
School in 1956–1957 will prove especially engaging. Here one learns that, in
addition to forming a steady friendship with Fuller, Hart maintained regular
contacts with Paul Freund, Erwin Griswold, Henry Hart, Roscoe Pound, and—
most interestingly—Herbert Wechsler, who was also visiting Harvard that year
while working as Lead Reporter on the American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code. As Lacey recounts, Hart (Herbert, not Henry) and Wechsler engaged in
lengthy discussions of criminal responsibility, punishment, and causation, the
last of which convinced Hart to modify the approach to causation he and
Honore´ were then taking in Causation in the Law. As a result, Hart and Honore´
52. H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAW Q. REV. 37 (1954), reprinted in
ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 21.
53. See Edgar Bodenheimer, Modern Analytical Jurisprudence and the Limits of Its Usefulness, 104
U. PA. L. REV. 1080 (1956); H.L.A. Hart, Analytical Jurisprudence in Mid-Century: A Reply to
Professor Bodenheimer, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (1957); see also Edgar Bodenheimer, Analytical
Positivism, Legal Realism, and the Future of Legal Method, 44 VA. L. REV. 365 (1958) (responding to
Hart’s reply).
54. See Hart, supra note 1 at 627; Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). The Hart-Fuller debate did not end here but continued for over a
decade. See HART, supra note 5, at 195–207 (discussing Fuller and the separation thesis); LON L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 133–45 (1964) (criticizing The Concept of Law); H.L.A. Hart, Book
Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1965) (reviewing and responding to FULLER, supra); LON L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW 187–242 (rev. ed. 1969) (responding to critics, including Hart).
55. See Patrick Devlin, Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence: The Enforcement of Morals (March
18, 1959), reprinted in PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 1 (1965) (defending the legal
enforcement of morality); H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and Treason, LISTENER, July 30, 1959, at 162
[hereinafter Hart, Immorality and Treason], reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 83 (Ronald Dworkin
ed., 1977) (criticizing Devlin); see also HART, supra note 6 (same); H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: TWO LECTURES (1965) [hereinafter HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW] (same);
H.L.A. Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1968) (same).
56. See HART AND HONORE´, supra note 4.
57. See H.L.A. Hart, Kelsen Visited, 10 UCLA L. REV. 709 (1963).
58. See HART, supra note 6.
59. See HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 55.
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decided to reconstruct their book in the form of a debate with the policy-
oriented approach to causation espoused by Wechsler and other American
lawyers.60
Lacey’s chapter on Hart’s visit to Harvard is also full of interesting and
amusing anecdotes, including one which sheds light on Hart’s relationship with
Dworkin, who was a student at Harvard Law School at the time. Here one
discovers that as early as the mid-1950s, Hart had expressed anxiety about the
implications of Dworkin’s ideas for his own legal theories, which Hart had
encountered when he served as an examiner on Dworkin’s undergraduate law
exams at Oxford in 1955. Hart was therefore keen to seek out Dworkin and
have dinner with him during his subsequent visit to Harvard.61 Another interest-
ing story reveals that the famous Hart-Fuller debate almost never came to pass
because of some overly intrusive edits by the editors of the Harvard Law
Review.62 There are some notable omissions here and elsewhere,63 however,
which are surprising in an intellectual biography such as this one. For example,
although Hart held an appointment in the Philosophy Department during his
Harvard visit, Lacey does not say whether he had any contact with W.V.O.
Quine, the dominant figure in American philosophy at the time, or what Hart
thought of Quine’s influential criticisms of the analytic-synthetic distinction.64
What, for instance, was Hart’s reaction to the reply to Quine which his Oxford
colleagues, H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson, had written the previous year?65
Surprisingly, there is no discussion of this topic here or elsewhere in this book,
nor of its implications for Hart’s understanding of the scope and methods of
analytical jurisprudence.
Suffering from “a loss of intellectual confidence and the feeling that he had
no further original contribution to make,”66 Hart took an early retirement from
the Oxford Chair in 1968, after helping to facilitate the selection of Dworkin as
his successor. Nevertheless, he continued to lecture and write on philosophical
topics, and he remained an active member of the Oxford community. From
1968 to 1972, Hart held a Senior Research Fellowship at University College,
and in 1972 he was elected Principal of Brasenose College, a position he held
until his retirement in 1978. During this period, Hart also assumed a leading
role in The Bentham Project, a long-standing (and ongoing) effort to organize,
edit, and publish the huge mass of mostly unpublished manuscripts Bentham
60. LACEY, supra note 2, at 188, 209–14.
61. Id. at 185–86.
62. Id. at 200.
63. See infra notes 122–43 and accompanying text.
64. See W.V.O. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20 (1951). We do learn that Hart
was close with Burton Dreben and Morton White, LACEY, supra note 2, at 179, 186, but Lacey does not
discuss their views on the analytic-synthetic distinction either, a subject to which White had also
recently contributed. See Morton White, The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism, in
JOHN DEWEY: PHILOSOPHER OF SCIENCE AND FREEDOM 316, 324 (Sidney Hook ed., 1950).
65. See H.P. Grice & P.F. Strawson, In Defense of a Dogma, 65 PHIL. REV. 141 (1956).
66. LACEY, supra note 2, at 297.
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had bequeathed to University College, London, at his death. For his part in this
project, Hart brought forth together with J.H. Burns a new edition of two of
Bentham’s major works, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation67 and A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on Govern-
ment.68 Hart also served as sole editor of Bentham’s Of Laws in General,69 and
he wrote a series of important essays on aspects of Bentham’s legal and political
thought, which later appeared in a 1982 volume, Essays on Bentham.70
In the last section of the biography (“After the Chair”), Lacey chronicles
these and other events in Hart’s life which occurred between 1968 and 1992,
when he passed away at the age of eighty-five. These chapters often make for
sad and painful reading, because Hart’s final years were not, generally speaking,
happy or contented ones. In 1983, four years after a major spy scandal in Britain
in which Anthony Blunt, a fellow intelligence officer with whom Hart shared an
office during World War II, was exposed as a KGB agent, Jenifer Hart gave a
series of interviews in which she spoke candidly of her pre-war Communist
sympathies, as well as certain contacts she had then with individuals she later
realized were Soviet agents. News outlets began covering the story, and shortly
thereafter the Sunday Times published an article under a sensational headline
which insinuated that Hart himself may have been guilty of espionage.71 The
Harts sued for defamation and their friends rallied around them in a show of
support, but the experience turned out to be devastating for Hart, who eventu-
ally suffered a nervous breakdown and had to be admitted to a psychiatric
hospital, where he underwent electro-convulsive shock therapy.72
As Lacey recounts, Hart’s last decade was also marked by his complex and
increasingly strained relationship with Dworkin73 and by Hart’s ongoing struggle
to formulate a definitive response to numerous criticisms of The Concept of
Law, particularly those pressed by Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously74 and
Law’s Empire.75 “Dutiful to the last,” she writes, “he could not bring himself to
give up the effort, but his energy was running out.”76 Hart’s response to his
critics remained largely unfinished at the time of his death, but one relatively
polished section responding to Dworkin was published posthumously in 1994,
67. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns &
H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1780/1789).
68. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (J.H.
Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Univ. of London 1977) (1774–1776).
69. JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL (H.L.A. Hart ed., Univ. of London 1970) (1782).
70. H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY (1982)
[hereinafter ESSAYS ON BENTHAM]. Hart also published a collection of his philosophical essays in 1983
spanning the entire length of his career. See ESSAYS, supra note 1.
71. “I Was a Russian Spy” Says MI5 Man’s Wife, SUNDAY TIMES, July 17 1983, cited in LACEY, supra
note 2, at 339.
72. LACEY, supra note 2, at 344–45.
73. Id. at 330–35.
74. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
75. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
76. LACEY, supra note 2, at 352.
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as an appendix to the second edition of The Concept of Law.77 “Hart’s Post-
script,” as it has become known, has since generated a significant secondary
literature of its own78 and has become an important, if controversial, part of
Hart’s legacy.79
II.
The subtitle of A Life of H.L.A. Hart, and the title of its final chapter, is drawn
from a lecture Hart delivered in 1977 and later published in the Georgia Law
Review,80 in which Hart contrasts two competing tendencies in American
jurisprudence: the “nightmare” that judges always or frequently make law81 and
the “noble dream” that they never or rarely do.82 Hart describes these tendencies
as “two extremes with many intermediate stopping places.”83 He associates the
first with prominent American legal realists like O.W. Holmes, Karl Llewellyn,
and Jerome Frank, and the second primarily with Ronald Dworkin, whom Hart,
with a nod to Shakespeare, calls “the noblest dreamer of them all.”84
Lacey’s subtitle is well chosen, for it encompasses multiple meanings and
furthers several different objectives, all of which are helpful in understanding
the significance of Hart’s life and accomplishments. One of these objectives is
to recall that Hart’s contributions to the theory of adjudication and to legal
theory generally are notable for their moderation and good sense, indeed that
Hart often conceived of those contributions in Aristotelian fashion as a mean
between extremes. This much is evident in the Georgia Law Review essay itself,
where after giving the nightmare and the noble dream their due, Hart endorses
77. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed. 1994).
78. LACEY, supra note 2, at 353.
79. See generally HART’S POSTSCRIPT, supra note 10. For Dworkin’s response to Hart, see Dworkin,
supra note 31; Ronald Dworkin, Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy, 24
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004).
80. H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977). The title of Hart’s essay echoes in turn a famous article by the
German jurist, Gustav Radbruch. See Gustav Radbruch, Anglo-American Jurisprudence through Conti-
nental Eyes, 52 LAW Q. REV. 530 (1936).
81. Hart, supra note 80, at 972 (“Litigants in law cases consider themselves entitled to have from
judges an application of the existing law to their disputes, not to have new law made for them . . . . The
Nightmare is that this image of the judge, distinguishing him from the legislator, is an illusion, and the
expectations which it excites are doomed to disappointment—on an extreme view, always, and on a
moderate view, very frequently.”).
82. Id. at 978 (“Like its antithesis the Nightmare, [the Noble Dream] has many variants, but in all
forms it represents the belief, perhaps the faith, that, in spite of superficial appearances to the contrary
and in spite even of whole periods of judicial aberrations and mistakes, still an explanation and
justification can be provided for the common expectation of litigants that judges should apply to their
cases existing law and not make new law for them even when the text of particular constitutional
provisions, statutes, or available precedents appears to offer no determinate guide.”).
83. Id. at 971.
84. Id. at 981–82. Hart does not explain the Shakespeare reference, but presumably he has in mind
Antony’s description of Brutus as “the noblest Roman of them all.” See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS
CAESAR act 5, sc. 5.
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the “unexciting truth” that judges sometimes make law and sometimes find it.85
This remark echoes a famous passage in The Concept of Law: “Formalism and
rule-skepticism are the Scylla and Charybdis of juristic theory; they are great
exaggerations, salutary where they correct each other, and the truth lies between
them.”86 Moreover, the same theme pervades Hart’s entire corpus and in many
ways encapsulates it. Hart explains the main thesis of The Concept of Law in
these terms,87 and he uses the same device in the book’s opening chapter to
characterize certain excessive tendencies of natural law and legal realism.88
Likewise, in The Morality of the Criminal Law, Hart defends a “moderate”
position on the elimination of mens rea in criminal liability, in contrast to both
the forward looking doctrine of radical utilitarian reformers like Lady Barbara
Wooten and the backward looking approach of traditional retributivists like
James Fitzjames Stephens.89 In Between Utility and Rights,90 Hart seeks to
navigate the twin shoals of “the old faith in utilitarianism and the new faith in
rights.”91 In Causation in the Law, Hart and Honore´ attempt to occupy a middle
ground on the issue of proximate causation, that is, “to reject causal minimalism
without embracing causal maximalism.”92 Throughout his career, Hart can be
seen resisting the pull of bold and exciting but ultimately excessive and
untenable arguments, and Lacey presumably wishes to recall this about him.
Lacey’s subtitle is also significant because it helps to focus our attention on
an important but easily overlooked part of Hart’s career, namely, the period
stretching from the mid-1970s until his nervous breakdown in 1983, whereupon
his productivity slowed considerably.93 This is when Lacey first met Hart, and
along with the other images her book evokes, she presumably wishes us to
remember Hart as she remembers him then: accomplished, confident, distin-
guished—“to all external appearances, a contented, successful, emotionally and
85. Hart, supra note 80, at 989.
86. HART, supra note 5, at 144.
87. Id. at 208 (“The idea of a union of primary and secondary rules to which so important a place
has been assigned in this book may be regarded as a mean between juristic extremes. For legal theory
has sought the key to the understanding of law sometimes in the simple idea of an order backed by
threats and sometimes in the complex idea of morality. With both of these law has certainly many
affinities and connexions; yet, as we have seen, there is a perennial danger of exaggerating these and of
obscuring the special features which distinguish law from other means of social control.”).
88. Id. at 8 (“[T]he assertion that ‘an unjust law is not a law’ has the same ring of exaggeration and
paradox, if not falsity, as ‘statutes are not laws’ or ‘constitutional law is not law’. It is characteristic of
the oscillation between extremes, which make up the history of legal theory, that those who have seen
in the close assimilation of law and morals nothing more than a mistaken inference from the fact that
law and morals share a common vocabulary of rights and duties, should have protested against it in
terms equally exaggerated and paradoxical. ‘The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.’”).
89. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 55, at 5–29, 24–25.
90. H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828 (1983), reprinted in ESSAYS,
supra note 1, at 198.
91. Id. at 221.
92. HART & HONORE´, supra note 4, at xxxv.
93. LACEY, supra note 2, at 328–53.
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financially secure man.”94 Additionally, it was during this period that Hart wrote
not only his Georgia Law Review essay, but also the chapters of what became
Essays on Bentham, plus a whole series of additional publications, including
sparkling commentaries on six highly influential books of moral and political
philosophy: John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice,95 Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State,
and Utopia,96 Ronald Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously,97 J.L. Mackie’s Eth-
ics: Inventing Right and Wrong,98 Gilbert Harman’s The Nature of Morality,99
and Peter Singer’s Practical Ethics.100 Though not widely read today, all of
these essays are insightful and repay careful reading. As Lacey observes, unlike
some of his other writings, “the tone of these essays of the mid-1970s is assured
and decisive; it is as if Herbert’s primary focus on the work of other scholars
relieved him of a sense of pressure to speak in his own voice and enabled him,
paradoxically, to do just that.”101 Lacey finds Hart’s initial responses to Dwor-
kin during this period especially noteworthy,102 describing them as “assured and
magisterial,”103 in contrast to “the tragedy of the ‘Postscript,’”104 whose quality
she finds “uneven”105 and other scholars have described as “frail and defen-
sive,”106 “not wholly convincing,”107 even “petulant, whiny . . . [and] pee-
vish.”108 By drawing attention to this unduly neglected period of Hart’s career,
therefore, Lacey implies that his legacy vis-a`-vis Dworkin should depend less
on the Postscript than on the more confident arguments of these earlier publica-
tions.
Finally, Lacey’s subtitle implies that Hart’s life itself was both a nightmare
and a noble dream. This is in many ways the book’s unifying theme; according
to Lacey, the “contrasts between external success and internal perplexities,
between being an insider but feeling like an outsider, constituted dynamic
94. Id. at 1.
95. H.L.A. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 534 (1973), reprinted in
ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 223 (discussing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)).
96. Hart, supra note 90 (discussing ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974)); H.L.A.
Hart, 1776–1976: Law in the Perspective of Philosophy, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 538 (1976) [hereinafter
Hart, 1776–1976], reprinted in ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 145 (same).
97. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 80 (discussing DWORKIN, supra note 74); Hart, supra note 90 (same).
98. H.L.A. Hart, Morality and Reality, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 9, 1978, at 35 (reviewing J.L. MACKIE,
ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977) and GILBERT HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS (1977)).
99. Id.
100. H.L.A. Hart, Death and Utility, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 15, 1980, at 25 (reviewing PETER SINGER,
PRACTICAL ETHICS (1979)).
101. LACEY, supra note 2, at 326.
102. See Hart, supra note 80; Hart, supra note 90; and Hart, 1776–1976, supra note 96. See also
H.L.A. HART, Legal Duty and Obligation, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 70, at 127–61.
103. LACEY, supra note 2, at 333.
104. Id. at 353.
105. Id.
106. Gardner, supra note 2, at 7.
107. Honore´, supra note 45, at 318.
108. Schroeder, supra note 15, at 814, 816.
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tensions which shaped almost all of Hart’s work and relationships.”109 Lacey
focuses throughout the book on four of Hart’s “internal perplexities”110—his
sexual orientation, Jewish identity, intellectual insecurity, and unconventional
marriage—and she produces ample evidence to suggest that Hart did, indeed,
struggle with them to varying degrees. For example, we learn that Hart was by
his own account a “suppressed homosexual,” whose lack of sexual appetite for
his wife caused a severe strain on their marriage;111 that Jenifer Hart had
numerous affairs with other men, including his best friend, Isaiah Berlin, and
the political philosopher, Michael Oakeshott;112 that Hart suffered periodic
doubts about the worth of his ideas and grappled his entire life with depression,
anxiety, and panic attacks;113 that he was torn between his “underlying sense of
Jewish identity and an intellectual commitment to its moral irrelevance”;114 and
that although Hart often projected “a highly anglicized, patrician, almost colo-
nial persona”115 and was largely welcomed into elite English culture, he also
endured some appalling acts of anti-Semitism.116
Yet, as critics have noted, the connection between these revelations and the
growth and development of Hart’s ideas is not altogether clear.117 Moreover,
one cannot help wondering whether by focusing on these rather sensational
aspects of Hart’s personal life, Lacey has missed an opportunity to explore
certain basic questions about his legal philosophy and its links to wider philosoph-
ical currents. I mentioned one example earlier: Hart’s attitude toward the
analytic-synthetic distinction. Recently, Brian Leiter, Ian Farrell, and other
scholars have drawn attention to the potential implications of Quine’s criticisms
of the distinction for the viability of conceptual analysis as a jurisprudential
method,118 and since this issue seems likely to become a focal point of future
109. LACEY, supra note 2, at 3.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 61, 74.
112. Id. at 174, 177–78.
113. See, e.g., id. at 3, 115, 127, 291, 297.
114. Id. at 271.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., id. at 33–35, 54, 313–14.
117. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 15, at 12 (“[Lacey’s] claim that the personal material is needed to
write an intellectual biography is a pretence”); Simpson, supra note 20, at 1449 (doubting whether “all
the revelations as to Herbert’s private and family life cast any real light on his academic work”); White,
supra note 12, at 330 (“[I]t is hard to see how the domestic and sexual dynamics of the Hart household
had an effect on the development of Hart’s ideas and the course of his career”). See also De´idre M.
Dwyer, The Three Lives of Herbert Hart, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 417–21 (2006) (examining
several difficulties with Lacey’s reliance on Hart’s diaries and private correspondence and suggesting
that her use of this personal material is only partially justified).
118. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 21, at 1001 n.88; Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism,
and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT, supra note 10, at 355, 366–70; Brian
Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS.
17, 44–50 (2003); see also John Oberdiek & Dennis Patterson, Moral Evaluation and Conceptual
Analysis in Jurisprudential Methodology, in CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES: LAW AND PHILOSOPHY (Ross
Harrison ed., forthcoming 2007).
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debates in the philosophy of law, one wishes that Lacey had shed light on Hart’s
own views of the matter. Another example is Hart’s apparent debt to Strawson:
although much ink has been spilled over Hart’s controversial remark in the
Preface to The Concept of Law that his book could be viewed as “an essay in
descriptive sociology,”119 Lacey does not explore whether, as seems likely,
Hart’s remark was originally simply a paraphrase of the subtitle of Strawson’s
1959 book, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics,120 and if so, what
if anything follows from this fact.121 Yet issues like these are really just the tip
of the iceberg. Here are some further questions about which one is naturally
curious but which A Life of H.L.A. Hart fails to illuminate:
1. What was Hart’s view of psychological behaviorism and its impact on the
philosophy of language and mind? Did he welcome the efforts of Skinner,
Watson, and other behaviorists to make psychology scientific by ridding
it of references to unobservable mental states?122 To what extent, beyond
the similarity of their titles, is The Concept of Law indebted to Ryle’s The
Concept of Mind?123 Did Hart embrace Ryle’s criticisms of “the dogma
of the Ghost in the Machine”?124 In particular, did he concur with Ryle
that common beliefs about “Reason and Conscience” are a “nursery
myth”?125 What role did behaviorism play in Hart’s preoccupation with
the ontological status of legal rules?126 Was it a latent commitment to
behaviorism that led him to assume that for a rule to be something other
than a mere habit, it must be prescriptive or normative?127
2. What did Hart think of the analogy Rawls drew in A Theory of Justice
between moral theory and generative grammar?128 Did he share Dwor-
kin’s view that Rawls’ analogy was “exciting” because it implied the
119. HART, supra note 5, at v (“Notwithstanding its concern with analysis the book may also be
regarded as an essay in descriptive sociology; for the suggestion that inquiries into the meanings of
words merely throw light on words is false.”).
120. See P.F. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS: AN ESSAY IN DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS (1959).
121. Although Lacey takes up Hart’s remark in her Leon Green ’15 Lecture in Jurisprudence at the
University of Texas Law School, she does not discuss the parallel to Strawson’s title there either. See
generally Nicola Lacey, Analytical Jurisprudence Versus Descriptive Sociology Revisited, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 945 (2006). For Hart’s own brief explanation of his prefatory remark, which does not refer to
Strawson or any other writer, see David Sugarman, Hart Interviewed: H.L.A. Hart in Conversation with
David Sugarman, 32 J. LAW & SOC’Y 267, 291 (2005).
122. See generally B.F. SKINNER, VERBAL BEHAVIOR (1957); JOHN WATSON, BEHAVIORISM (1925).
123. GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949).
124. Id. at 15–16.
125. Id. at 315.
126. See, e.g., HART, supra note 5, at 8 (“What are rules? What does it mean to say a rule exists?”).
127. See, e.g., id. at 9 (contrasting “mere convergent behavior and the existence of a social rule”); id.
at 10 (“What then is the crucial difference between merely convergent habitual behavior in a social
group and the existence of a rule of which the words ‘must’, ‘should’, and ‘ought to’ are often a
sign?”); id. at 11 (“What can there be in a rule apart from regular and hence predictable punishment or
reproof of those who deviate from the usual patterns of conduct, which distinguishes it from a mere
group habit?”).
128. See RAWLS, supra note 95, at 45–52.
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existence of “innate categories of morality common to all men, imprinted
on their neural structure”?129 Did he concur with Hare that the analogy is
fundamentally inapt?130 Was Hart intrigued that Fuller had also compared
rules of justice with rules of grammar?131 Did he recognize that Ryle,
Ross, and Oakeshott had done so as well?132 What did Hart make of the
fact that Simpson’s interpretation of classical common law theory also
drew the same comparison: “Formulations of the common law are to be
conceived of as similar to grammarians’ rules, which both describe
linguistic practices and attempt to systematize and order them”?133 How
did Hart react to Simpson’s contention that The Concept of Law simply
ignores the common law and therefore is necessarily defective?134
3. What was Hart’s response to generative linguistics itself? Did he wel-
come the modern revival of Universal Grammar?135 Did it spark an
interest in Bentham’s writings on Universal Grammar,136 or lead him to
investigate the connections Bentham drew between Universal Grammar
and Universal Jurisprudence?137 Did it cause him to reassess the philosoph-
ical significance of Bentham’s theory of fictions?138 What did Hart think
of his colleagues’ reactions to Chomsky’s research program? Did he share
Austin’s enthusiasm for Syntactic Structures?139 Was he sympathetic to
Ryle’s criticism of Chomsky’s defense of innate ideas?140 Did he share
Strawson’s interest in Chomsky’s work on deep structure and grammati-
cal transformations?141
129. DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 158.
130. See R. M. Hare, Rawls’ Theory of Justice, in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS’ A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 81, 85–86 (Norman Daniels ed., 2d prtg. 1989).
131. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5–13 (rev. ed. 1969).
132. See, e.g., MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, The Tower of Babel, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER
ESSAYS 59, 61–62 (1962); W.D. ROSS, FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 169 (1939); RYLE, supra note 123, at 316.
133. Simpson, supra note 26, at 94.
134. See generally id.
135. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, CARTESIAN LINGUISTICS: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF RATIONAL-
IST THOUGHT (1966) (describing the Enlightenment origins of Universal Grammar).
136. See generally C.K. OGDEN, BENTHAM’S THEORY OF FICTIONS (1932). See also JEREMY BENTHAM,
Chrestomathia (1843), reprinted in 8 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 150–55, 185–91 (John
Bowring ed., Thoemmes Press 1995) [hereinafter WORKS]; JEREMY BENTHAM, A Fragment on Ontology,
reprinted in 8 WORKS, supra, at 193; JEREMY BENTHAM, Essay on Language, reprinted in 8 WORKS,
supra, at 295; JEREMY BENTHAM, Essay on Logic, reprinted in 8 WORKS, supra, at 213; JEREMY BENTHAM,
Fragments on Universal Grammar, reprinted in 8 WORKS, supra, at 339.
137. See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 67, at 6, 294–95; BENTHAM, supra note 68, at 418; BENTHAM,
supra note 69, at 251. See James E. Crimmins, Bentham’s Philosophical Politics, 3 HARV. REV. PHIL. 18,
20 (1993) (noting that Bentham’s manuscripts on the fundamental elements of Universal Jurisprudence—
some 614 pages—still await publication).
138. See generally OGDEN, supra note 136.
139. NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES (1957). See also G.J. Warnock, John Langshaw Austin,
A Biographical Sketch, in SYMPOSIUM ON J.L. AUSTIN 3, 14–15 (K.T. Fann ed., 1969) (observing that
Austin taught Syntactic Structures in his last “Saturday mornings” seminar before his death).
140. See GILBERT RYLE, Mowgli in Babel, in ON THINKING 95 (1979) (reviewing ZENO VENDLER, RES
COGITANS: AN ESSAY IN RATIONALIST PSYCHOLOGY (1972)).
141. See Peter F. Strawson, Grammar and Philosophy, in SEMANTICS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 455
(Donald Davidson & Gilbert Harman eds., 1975).
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4. What was Hart’s attitude toward human rights? Did he welcome the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948?142 If so,
how did he reconcile it with his commitment to legal positivism? Did he
embrace the Declaration’s affirmation of economic, social, and cultural
rights? How did Hart’s reaction to the Universal Declaration influence
the philosophical analysis of rights he developed in his publications of the
late 1940s and 1950s?143 How, if at all, did Hart’s attitude toward human
rights change over the course of his career?
Questions like these are hardly orthogonal to the intellectual and social
worlds Hart inhabited, and they comprise a mere subset of those to which an
intellectual biography of him would ideally provide answers. That Lacey does
not engage any of them may be the most disappointing feature of her otherwise
compelling narrative. In the remainder of this Essay, I attempt to answer some
of these questions, drawing on various parts of Hart’s corpus along with Lacey’s
own fruitful exploration of Hart’s life and career. My central argument is that a
genuinely puzzling aspect of Hart’s legal theory is how detached it now seems
from many of the most significant intellectual events of the past fifty years,
including the modern revival of Universal Grammar, the cognitive revolution in
the sciences of mind, brain, and behavior, and the human rights revolution in
constitutional and international law, all of which would appear to have signifi-
cant implications for the tradition of general and descriptive jurisprudence with
which Hart was associated.144 After providing some support for this claim in
Part III, I offer a partial explanation of this state of affairs in Part IV.
III.
The story of jurisprudence Lacey tells in A Life of H.L.A. Hart is a familiar
one, which largely mirrors the one found in many student textbooks. The story
centers around Hart’s relationship to the philosophy of language. Lacey con-
tends that Hart’s “crucial philosophical innovation” was to combine the insights
of legal positivism with the methods of “the new linguistic philosophy repre-
sented by the work of J.L. Austin, Frederick Waismann, and Ludwig Wittgen-
stein.”145 However, she neglects to explain what exactly those methods are, or
to explore the fate of ordinary language philosophy since the 1950s. This leaves
the impression that she has not thought critically about how such major events
as the overthrow of logical positivism, the demise of behaviorism, and the rise
142. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10,
1948).
143. See H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955); see also Hart, supra
note 52; Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, supra note 43.
144. See HART, supra note 77, at 239–40 (characterizing his own legal theory as one which is both
“general in the sense that it is not tied to any particular legal system or legal culture” and “descriptive
in that it is morally neutral and has no justificatory aims”).
145. LACEY, supra note 2, at 4–5, 225.
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of generative linguistics should inform our understanding of this aspect of
Hart’s legacy. Linguistics, psychology, and the philosophy of language and
mind are much different today than they were in the 1940s and 1950s, and the
philosopher Tyler Burge expresses a common view when he observes that
ordinary language philosophy’s “primary contribution to the philosophy of
language, its focus on details of usage, yielded better results when it later allied
itself with systematic theory.”146 Yet these developments make virtually no
appearance in A Life of H.L.A. Hart, leading one to ponder the significance of
their absence.
The central event in the study of language of the past fifty years, to which
ordinary language philosophy has long since given way, is the so-called “Chom-
skyan Turn,”147 which transformed the study of language and mind by showing
that ordinary language is susceptible to precise formal analysis and by rooting
knowledge of language in the human bioprogram. From this perspective, while
philosophers like Austin and Wittgenstein were correct to criticize the neglect
by logical positivists of the variety of uses (beyond the paradigm case of
asserting) to which ordinary language can be put, and while they deserve credit
for calling attention to many subtle nuances of ordinary usage, their approach
was inherently incapable of providing an adequate theory of language because
of its characteristically unsystematic orientation and its fundamentally flawed
empiricist epistemology.148 Today, researchers around the world investigate
language within Chomsky’s paradigm of Universal Grammar, and they have
discovered that Chomsky was fundamentally correct to postulate that the gram-
mars of individual languages throughout the world are variations on a single,
universal pattern.149 For example, in English the verb comes before the object
(pick fruit) and the preposition comes before the noun phrase (from the tree). In
Japanese, things are reversed: the object comes before the verb (fruit pick) and
the noun phrase comes before the preposition, or rather, the postposition (the
tree from).150 However, as Steven Pinker explains,
it is a significant discovery that both languages have verbs, objects, and pre-
or post-positions to start with, as opposed to countless other conceivable kinds
of apparatus that could power a communication system. And it is even more
significant that unrelated languages build their phrases by assembling a head
146. Tyler Burge, Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950–1990, 101 PHIL. REV. 3, 13 (1992).
147. THE CHOMSKYAN TURN (Asa Kasher ed., 1991).
148. See generally Burge, supra note 146; Noam Chomsky, Some Empirical Assumptions in Modern
Philosophy of Language, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 260
(Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes & Morton White eds., 1969); Jerry A. Fodor & Jerrold J. Katz,
Introduction to THE STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE: READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 1 (Jerry A.
Fodor & Jerrold J. Katz eds., 1964).
149. See generally MARK C. BAKER, THE ATOMS OF LANGUAGE: THE MIND’S HIDDEN RULES OF
GRAMMAR (2001); RAY JACKENDOFF, PATTERNS IN THE MIND: LANGUAGE AND HUMAN NATURE (1994);
STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT: HOW THE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE (1994).
150. STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 37 (2002).
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(such as a verb or preposition) and a complement (such as a noun phrase) and
assigning a consistent order to the two. In English the head comes first; in
Japanese the head comes last. But everything else about the structure of
phrases in the two languages is pretty much the same. And so it goes with
phrase after phrase and language after language. The common kinds of heads
and complements can be ordered in 128 logically possible ways, but 95
percent of the world’s languages use one of two: either the English ordering
or its mirror image the Japanese ordering. A simple way to capture this
uniformity is to say that all languages have the same grammar except for a
parameter or switch that can be flipped to either the “head-first” or “head-last”
setting. The linguist Mark Baker has recently summarized about a dozen of
these parameters, which succinctly capture most of the known variation
among the languages of the world.151
Needless to say, these and related scientific developments in the study of
language and cognition have profound implications for law and legal theory,
which legal scholars have only recently begun to explore in earnest.152 Perhaps
the most important is their potential to transform our understanding of a cluster
of interrelated topics, including the concept of universal jurisprudence, the
origin of the law of nations, the idea of human rights, and—perhaps most
fundamentally—the hypothesis of innate moral knowledge which lies at the
heart of the perennial debate between natural law and legal positivism. Al-
though this hypothesis has long been unfashionable, the fashion in moral
psychology is now rapidly changing,153 and the psychology and biology of
human morality has become one of the liveliest topics in the cognitive and brain
sciences, as a plethora of recent books attest: The Ethical Brain,154 The Moral
151. Id. at 37–38 (citing BAKER, supra note 149).
152. See, e.g., MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: EMPATHY IN LAW AND PUNISHMENT
91–112 (2006) (drawing on linguistic theory to investigate the sense of justice); GEORGE FLETCHER,
BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1998) (proposing a “universal grammar of the criminal law”
analogous to universal grammar); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 57,
68–69 (1998) (drawing on Chomsky’s theory of innate cognitive capacities to reply to historicist
objections to the idea of human rights); LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993)
(applying linguistic theory to problems of statutory interpretation and adjudication); Jim Chen, Law as
a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263, 1279 (1995) (arguing that the “existence of
universal grammar reinforces the discovery of universals in other language-based disciplines,” includ-
ing law); Stuart P. Green, The Universal Grammar of Criminal Law, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2104 (1998)
(reviewing FLETCHER, supra); Robin Bradley Kar, The Deep Structure of Law and Morality, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 877, 878 (2006) (arguing that “law and morality share a deep and pervasive structure—an
analogue in the moral and legal domain of what Noam Chomsky has called the ‘deep structure’ or
‘universal grammar’ of language”); John Mikhail, Law, Science, and Morality: A Review of Richard
Posner’s The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1057, 1088–98 (2002)
(explaining the analogy between rules of justice and rules of grammar and criticizing Judge Posner’s
conception of morality and moral theory in light of it).
153. See generally Rebecca Saxe, Do the Right Thing: Cognitive Science’s Search for a Common
Morality, BOSTON REV., Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 33.
154. MICHAEL GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN (2005).
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Sense,155 The Moral Animal,156 The Origins of Virtue,157 Hardwired Behav-
ior,158 Good Natured,159 Moral Minds,160 and other similar titles. Philosophers
and scientists have begun to inquire whether the human genetic program
includes a Universal Moral Grammar analogous to the linguist’s notion of
Universal Grammar, that is, an innate function or acquisition device that maps
the child’s early experience into the system of principles that constitutes the
mature state of her moral faculty and generates her moral intuitions.161 The
psychology of moral development has become a particularly fruitful field of
investigation, and developmental psychologists have begun to reveal that the
intuitive jurisprudence of young children is complex and exhibits many charac-
teristics of a well-developed legal code, including abstract theories of crime,
tort, contract, and agency.162 Recent work by comparative linguists suggests
155. JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993).
156. ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: WHY WE ARE, THE WAY WE ARE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (1996).
157. MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
(1996).
158. LAWRENCE R. TANCREDI, HARDWIRED BEHAVIOR: WHAT NEUROSCIENCE REVEALS ABOUT MORALITY
(2005).
159. FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS AND OTHER
ANIMALS (1996).
160. MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: HOW NATURE DESIGNED OUR UNIVERSAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND
WRONG (2006).
161. See, e.g., GILBERT HARMAN, Moral Philosophy and Linguistics, in EXPLAINING VALUE 217
(2000); HAUSER, supra note 160; MATTHIAS MAHLMANN, RATIONALISMUS IN DER PRAKTISCHEN THEORIE:
NORMENTHEORIE UND PRAKTISCHE KOMPETENZ (1999); Susan Dwyer, Moral Competence, in PHILOSOPHY
AND LINGUISTICS 169 (Kumiko Murasugi & Robert Stainton eds., 1999); Joshua Greene, Cognitive
Neuroscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind, in THE INNATE MIND: STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS 338
(Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich eds., 2005); Joshua Knobe, Theory of Mind and
Moral Cognition: Exploring the Connections, 9 TRENDS COG. SCI. 357 (2005); Matthias Mahlmann &
John Mikhail, Cognitive Science, Ethics, and Law, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY 95 (Zenon Bankowski
ed., 2005); Mikhail, supra note 152; John Mikhail, Cristina M. Sorrentino & Elizabeth S. Spelke,
Toward a Universal Moral Grammar, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE
COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY 1250 (Morton A. Gernsbacher & Sharon J. Derry eds., 1998); Shaun
Nichols, Innateness and Moral Psychology, in THE INNATE MIND, supra at 353; John Mikhail, Rawls’
Linguistic Analogy: A Study of the “Generative Grammar” Model of Moral Theory Described by John
Rawls in “A Theory of Justice” (May 2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University),
http://ssrn.com/abstract766464; Jennifer Nado, Daniel Kelly & Stephen Stich, Moral Judgment, in
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY (John Symons & Paco Calvo eds., forthcom-
ing 2007).
162. For example, three- and four-year-old children use intent or purpose to distinguish two acts
with the same result. See, e.g., Sharon Nelson, Factors Influencing Young Children’s Use of Motives
and Outcomes as Moral Criteria, 51 CHILD DEV. 823 (1980). They also distinguish “genuine” moral
violations (e.g., theft, battery) from violations of social conventions (e.g., wearing pajamas to school).
See, e.g., Judith G. Smetana, Social Cognitive-Development: Domain Distinctions and Coordinations, 3
DEV. REV. 131, 135 (1983). Four- and five-year-olds use a proportionality principle to determine the
appropriate level of punishment for principals and accessories. See, e.g., Norman J. Finkel, Marsha B.
Liss & Virginia R. Moran, Equal or Proportional Justice for Accessories? Children’s Pearls of
Proportionate Wisdom, 18 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 229, 240 (1997). Five- and six-year-
olds use false factual beliefs but not false moral beliefs to exculpate. See, e.g., Michael J. Chandler,
Bryan W. Sokal & Cecilia Wainryb, Beliefs About Truth and Beliefs About Rightness, 71 CHILD DEV. 91,
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that every natural language has words or devices to express the three basic
deontic concepts—may, must, must not, or their equivalents;163 while anthropolo-
gists and comparative lawyers have suggested that prohibitions of murder, rape,
and other types of aggression are universal,164 as are distinctions based on
causation, intention, and voluntary behavior.165 In a similar vein, George Fletcher
has argued that a small set of basic distinctions captures the “deep structure” or
“universal grammar” of all systems of criminal law.166 Finally, recent functional
imaging and clinical evidence suggests that a fairly consistent network of brain
regions is involved in moral cognition, although this conclusion remains both
preliminary and highly controversial.167 In short, researchers from a variety of
disciplines have begun to converge on a scientific theory of moral cognition
which, at least in its broad contours, bears a striking resemblance to classical
ideas of natural law and the foundation of the law of nations that reverberate
throughout the ages.168
93 (2000). See generally John Mikhail, The Poverty of the Moral Stimulus, in 1 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY:
INNATENESS AND ADAPTATION (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., forthcoming 2007).
163. See generally MODALITY IN GRAMMAR AND DISCOURSE (Joan Bybee & Suzanne Fleischman eds.,
1995).
164. See, e.g., DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 138 (1991); see also PINKER, supra note 149,
at 412–15 (citing BROWN).
165. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 152.
166. See id.
167. See, e.g., Jorge Moll et al., The Neural Basis of Human Moral Cognition, 6 NATURE REVIEWS
NEUROSCIENCE 799 (2005) (arguing that a fairly consistent network of brain regions is implicated in
moral cognition, including the anterior prefrontal cortex, medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortex,
dorsolateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, anterior temporal lobes, and superior temporal sulcus
region). But see Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 517, 523 (2002) (holding that “there is no specifically moral part of the brain”
and that “if one attempts to ‘deconfound’ moral judgment with everything that is not specific to moral
judgment . . . there will almost certainly be nothing left”).
168. Recall some of the most famous and important formulations, presented here in chronological
order: (1) Cicero: Natural law is “something which is implanted in us, not by opinion, but by a kind of
innate instinct.” CICERO, DE INVENTIONE, II, 65, cited in MICHAEL BERTRAM CROWE, THE CHANGING
PROFILE OF THE NATURAL LAW 40 (1977); (2) Paul: “When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by
nature those things that are of the law . . . [they] show the work of the law written in their hearts. . . .”
Romans 2:14–15, cited in CROWE, supra, at 52; (3) Gaius: “All peoples who are governed under laws
and customs observe in part their own special law and in part a law common to all men . . . which
natural reason has established among all human beings . . . and is called jus gentium, as being the law
which all nations observe.” DIG. 1.1.9 (Gaius, Institutes 1) (Alan Watson trans.); (4) Ulpian: “Natural
law is what nature has taught all animals.” DIG. 1.1.1.3 (Ulpian, Institutes 1), cited in CROWE, supra, at
45; (5) Isadore: Natural law is “what is common to all nations and is set up by natural instinct and not
by any positive institution.” ISADORE, BOOK OF ETYMOLOGIES, V, 4, cited in CROWE, supra, at 69; (6)
Gratian: “Natural law is common to all nations by reason of its universal origin in a natural instinct and
not in any (positive) constitution.” GRATIAN, DECRETUM, D.I, 7, cited in CROWE, supra, at 75; (7)
Aquinas: Natural law is “a natural disposition of the human mind . . . concerned with the basic
principles of behavior.” THOMAS AQUINAS, DEBATED QUESTIONS ON TRUTH, 16.1, cited in TIMOTHY C.
POTTS, CONSCIENCE IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 124 (1980); (8) Suarez: Natural law is “that form of law
which dwells within the human mind, in order that the righteous may be distinguished from the evil.”
FRANCISCO SU´AREZ, DE LEGIBUS AC DEO LEGISLATORE, I.3.9 (James Brown Scott ed., 1944) (1612); (9)
Grotius: “Natural Law is the Dictate of Right Reason, indicating that any act, from its agreement or
disagreement with the rational [and social] nature [of man], has in it a moral turpitude or a moral
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Returning to Hart, one of the mysteries surrounding his intellectual biogra-
phy, which Lacey’s book does not illuminate, is his attitude toward this set of
ideas, which were already beginning to swirl around him during the period in
which he occupied the Oxford Chair. Surprisingly, Hart devoted very little
attention to any of these topics, despite having many opportunities to do so. For
example, although from the late 1950s onward many of Hart’s colleagues were
deeply engaged with Chomsky’s ideas—Austin, for instance, taught Syntactic
Structures in the last term before his death169—and by the early 1970s, scholars
from a variety of disciplines were already describing Chomsky’s influence in
monumental terms,170 Hart stood apart from these developments and displayed
no discernible interest in the new linguistics. Why this happened is not entirely
clear, but it meant that Hart continued to write about language and linguistic
phenomena through the 1980s as if the “Chomskyan turn” in linguistics had
never occurred.171
The mystery deepens when we consider the analogy between grammar and
necessity . . . .” HUGO GROTIUS, 1 DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS [ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE] I.1.10
(William Whewell trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1853) (1625) (alteration in original); (10) Hume: “The
final sentence . . . which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious, praiseworthy or blam-
able . . . depends on some internal sense or feeling which nature has made universal in the whole
species.” DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 6 (Charles W. Hendel ed.,
1957) (1751); (11) James Wilson: “The moral sense is a distinct and original power of the human
mind . . . . Our knowledge of moral philosophy, of natural jurisprudence, of the law of nations, must
ultimately depend, for its first principles, on the evidence and information of the moral sense.” JAMES
WILSON, Of the Nature and Philosophy of Evidence, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 369, 378–79
(Robert Green McCloskey ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1967) (1804); (12) Thomas Jefferson: “Hob-
bes . . . [believes] that justice is founded in contract solely, and does not result from the construction of
man. I believe, on the contrary, that it is instinct, and innate, that the moral sense is as much a part of
our constitution as that of feeling, seeing, or hearing.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams
(Oct. 14, 1816), in 2 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS: THE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND ABIGAIL AND JOHN ADAMS 490, 492 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959).
169. See Warnock, supra note 139.
170. See, e.g., John Searle, Chomsky’s Revolution in Linguistics, in ON NOAM CHOMSKY: CRITICAL
ESSAYS 2, 7 (Gilbert Harman ed., 1974) (“ ‘The extraordinary and traumatic impact of the publication of
Syntactic Structures by Noam Chomsky in 1957 can hardly be appreciated by one who did not live
through the upheaval.’ ”) (quoting Howard Maclay, Overview, in SEMANTICS 163 (Danny D. Steinberg
& Leon A. Jakobovits eds., 1971)); Gilbert Harman, Introduction to ON NOAM CHOMSKY, supra, at vii
(“[N]othing has had a greater impact on contemporary philosophy than Chomsky’s theory of lan-
guage”); JOHN LYONS, NOAM CHOMSKY 9 (1970) (noting that Syntactic Structures “revolutionized the
scientific study of language”).
171. See, e.g., ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 2–6, 3 (reflecting on how linguistic philosophers like Austin
and Wittgenstein sought to analyze how “identical grammatical forms” conceal subtle differences of
meaning without calling attention to Chomsky’s subsequent work on deep structure); HART, ESSAYS ON
BENTHAM, supra note 70, at 10 (explaining Bentham’s view that “the relation of language and so of
thought to the world is radically misunderstood if we conceive of sentences as compounded out of
words which simply name or stand for elements of reality” without noting the parallel to Chomsky’s
internalist semantics); id. at 129–32 (discussing Bentham’s paraphrastic analysis of terms like “right,”
“duty,” and “obligation” without reference to the modern theory of linguistic transformations); H.L.A.
Hart, Book Review, 94 MIND 153 (1985) (reviewing ROSS HARRISON, BENTHAM (1983)) (same); cf.
Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison, in HART’S
POSTSCRIPT, supra note 10, at 1, 5–6 (remarking that “the story . . . of Hart’s forays into the philosophy
of language” is “a sad one” in which “[v]ery little seems to have been gained”).
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jurisprudence which bulks so large in the Western legal tradition Hart inherited.
Although the link between these subjects traces at least as far back as Aristotle’s
observation in The Politics that the gift of speech and a sense of justice are what
distinguish humans from other animals,172 and although the comparison be-
tween rules of justice and rules of grammar was a popular one among Enlighten-
ment philosophers and jurists, including Adam Smith, David Hume, Samuel
Pufendorf, and Matthew Hale,173 the modern positivist discussion of the topic
begins in earnest with Bentham, in particular with Bentham’s brief remarks on
universal jurisprudence in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation. Bentham introduced the term “universal jurisprudence” by an
implicit analogy to Universal Grammar to denote the science of those notions
that appear in “the laws of all nations,” such as “power, right, obligation,
liberty, and many others.”174 The basic idea was picked up and elaborated by
Austin, who renamed the inquiry general jurisprudence, which he defined as
“the science concerned with the exposition of the principles, notions, and
distinctions which are common to systems of law.”175
Austin’s most significant follower, in turn, was Thomas E. Holland, whose
Elements of Jurisprudence was the most widely used jurisprudence textbook in
172. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, Bk. 1, 1253a1-15 (Steven Everson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (“[T]hat man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident.
Nature . . . makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who has the gift of speech . . . . And it is
[also] a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the
like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.”).
173. See, e.g., Matthew Hale, Preface to ROLLE’S ABRIDGMENT (1668), reprinted in READINGS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 341 (Jerome Hall ed., 1938) (comparing mastery of the common law with knowledge of
grammar); DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 490 (P.H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1978) (1739–1740) (comparing the origin of justice to the establishment of human language); ADAM
SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 175 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., Oxford Univ. Press
1976) (1759) (comparing the rules of justice to the rules of grammar); Samuel Pufendorf, On the Duty
of Man and Citizen (1673), reprinted in 1 MORAL PHILOSOPHY FROM MONTAIGNE TO KANT: AN ANTHOLOGY
158, 164 (J.B. Schneewind ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1990) (explaining the meaning of “[t]he
common saying that the law is known by nature” by observing that “[e]veryone has the same
experience with his mother tongue”).
174. BENTHAM, supra note 67, at 295; see also id. at 6 (enumerating “obligation, right, power,
possession, title, exemption, immunity, franchise, privilege, nullity, validity, and the like” as the “short
list of terms, the exposition of which contains all that can be said with propriety to belong to the head of
universal jurisprudence”). But cf. Crimmins, supra note 137.
175. John Austin, The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence, in THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED 365, 367 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1954) (1832). Austin’s list of common principles is more
extensive than Bentham’s and includes (1) “notions of Duty, Right, Liberty, Injury, Punishment,
Redress; with their various relations to one another, and to Law, Sovereignty, and Independent Political
Society”; (2) the distinction between written and unwritten law; (3) the distinction between rights in
rem and rights in personam; (4) the distinction between property or dominion and “the variously
restricted rights which are carved out of [them]”; (5) the division of obligations into those arising from
contracts, those arising from injuries (i.e., delicts), and those arising “from incidents that are neither
contracts nor injuries” (i.e., obligations quasi ex contractu); and (6) the division of injuries into civil
and criminal, and the subordinate division of civil injuries into torts, breaches of contract, and breaches
of obligations quasi ex contractu. Id. at 367–68. In line with his positivism, however, Austin’s list does
not include the mala in se/mala prohibita distinction, a point to which we return. See infra notes 193,
247–49 and accompanying text.
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England for the next fifty years and exerted a significant impact on many
leading British and American writers, including Pollock, Salmond, Gray, Hohfeld,
Langdell, and Pound.176 Holland defined jurisprudence as the formal science of
law: “not the material science of those portions of the law which various nations
have in common, but the formal science of those relations of mankind which are
generally recognized as having legal consequences.”177 Explaining what he
meant by a “formal science,” Holland drew an analogy to grammar, the abstract
science of language under which “all the phenomena of any language find
appropriate places.”178 Just as grammar studies concepts and relationships
appearing in all languages, so jurisprudence analyzes “those comparatively few
and simple ideas which underlie the infinite variety of legal rules.” 179
Holland’s linguistic analogy provoked a flurry of criticism from some of the
era’s most prominent jurists. Frederick Pollock, for example, questioned whether
the analogy was intelligible:
The parallel is felicitous, and only too felicitous. If it be just, it goes a little
too far for the writer’s purpose. Abstract grammar, in the sense here specified,
is evidently a conceivable science. But is it an actual science in the sense of
being explicitly taught or learnt by any one? We have never heard of its
professors or text-books. No such teachers or books, as far as I can learn, have
been called forth by the development of modern philology.180
Likewise, John Chipman Gray argued that “Jurisprudence is, in truth, no more a
formal science than Physiology.”181 While conceding that language is “subject
to rigorous rules which have operated controllingly without the conscious
knowledge of those who have in fact obeyed them,” Gray objected that the type
of legal science Holland envisioned, which seeks “to show what universal
forces of human nature have caused the Jurisprudence of the globe to be what it
is . . . does not yet exist.”182
Pollock and Gray did not live to witness the birth of a new scientific
paradigm that transformed linguistics and psychology and helped make Chom-
sky one of the ten most-cited authors in all of the humanities (surpassing Hegel
and Cicero, and trailing only Marx, Lenin, Shakespeare, the Bible, Aristotle,
176. See THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE (13th ed. 1924). The book ran
to thirteen editions, the last appearing in 1924. On Holland’s influence on subsequent British and
American writers, see JAMES HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870–1970: A HISTORY 84–93 (1990);
WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 25–33 (2000).
177. HOLLAND, supra note 176, at 9.
178. Id. at 6.
179. Id. at 1.
180. FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 3–4 (London, MacMillan & Co.
1882).
181. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 145 (2d ed. Peter Smith 1972)
(1909).
182. Id. at 136–37.
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Plato, and Freud).183 But Hart did, and he was well-positioned to examine the
modern revival of Universal Grammar and draw out its implications for jurispru-
dence and legal theory. Indeed, Hart was arguably uniquely qualified to do so
for many reasons, including his background in linguistic philosophy,184 his
superb linguistic skills,185 his interest in Bentham,186 and his familiarity with
the jurisprudential history we have been chronicling.187 And yet Hart did not do
so, for reasons that remain obscure.
Hart’s attitude toward Rawls’ linguistic analogy is especially puzzling. The
centerpiece of the conception of moral theory Rawls articulates in A Theory of
Justice is what we may call the moral grammar hypothesis: the assumption that
each individual develops a moral sense or sense of justice under normal
circumstances, whose essential properties the moral theorist must describe and
explain, using concepts and models similar to those used in the study of
language.188 Although A Theory of Justice became highly influential, Rawls’
linguistic analogy was not warmly received, and early reviews by R.M. Hare,
Thomas Nagel, Ronald Dworkin, and Peter Singer sharply criticized or other-
wise distanced themselves from Rawls’ proposal, as did subsequent commentar-
ies by Norman Daniels, Richard Brandt, Joseph Raz, and Bernard Williams.189
Virtually alone among his peers, Hart refrained altogether from discussing the
topic.190 Likewise, although both Fuller and Williams address the linguistic
183. See PINKER, supra note 149, at 23.
184. See, e.g., LACEY, supra note 2, at 4–6, 132–51. Interestingly, Hart used “linguistics” to describe
the jurisprudence seminar he taught at Harvard Law School: “After the initial shock of my accent and
my refusal to do sociology, and natural law, they seem to enjoy linguistics and comparisons of law with
the rules of Baseball: They’ll be raging positivists before we’re ‘thru’ and then there’ll be a row.” Id. at
185.
185. See, e.g., id. at 20–21, 25, 292; cf. Sugarman, supra note 121, at 271 (“SUGARMAN: I
wondered whether the barrister’s manipulation of words, that concern with language, might have
possibly ‘connected’ with your passion for philosophy? HART: I’d always been passionately interested
in language. As a schoolboy I tried to learn about a dozen languages. Words had always fascinated
me.”).
186. See, e.g., LACEY, supra note 2, at 297–302. See generally HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note
70.
187. On Hart’s familiarity with Gray and Holland, see, for example, Hart, supra note 1, at 56
(quoting Gray); id. at 55 n.21 (citing Holland).
188. See RAWLS, supra note 95, at 45–53. See generally Mikhail, Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy, supra
note 161. Note that as described here, the moral grammar hypothesis includes three distinct ideas: (1)
each individual develops a moral sense or sense of justice under normal circumstances, (2) whose
essential properties the moral theorist must describe and explain, (3) using concepts and models similar
to those used in the study of language. In what follows, for ease of exposition, I sometimes use the
phrase in a more restricted sense to refer to (1) and (2) only, or to (1) only, as circumstances warrant.
189. See RICHARD BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 16–23 (1979); BERNARD WILLIAMS,
ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 93–99 (1985); Norman Daniels, Some Methods of Ethics and
Linguistics, 37 PHIL. STUD. 21 (1980); DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 150–83; Hare, supra note 130;
Thomas Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in Daniels, supra note 130, at 1–16; Joseph Raz, The Claims of
Reflective Equilibrium, 25 INQUIRY 307 (1982); Peter Singer, Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium, 58
MONIST 490 (1974).
190. See Hart, supra note 95 (discussing Rawls without reference to the linguistic analogy).
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analogy at some length,191 Hart’s critical reviews of The Morality of Law and
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy pass right over those comparisons.192
Turning more directly to the moral grammar hypothesis itself, Hart’s neglect
of this topic throughout his career is also quite mysterious. In 1954, Hart edited
and wrote an introduction to a new edition of John Austin’s The Province of
Jurisprudence Determined, but he noticeably refrained from commenting there
on Austin’s vigorous attack on the moral grammar hypothesis in Lecture IV or
his use of that attack to undermine the traditional distinctions between jus
gentium/jus civile and mala in se/mala prohibita in Lectures IV and V.193 In
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, and again in The Concept of
Law, Hart distinguished five main doctrines associated with legal positivism:
(1) laws are the commands of human beings; (2) there is no necessary connec-
tion between law and morals; (3) the analysis of legal concepts is worth
pursuing and should be distinguished from historical, sociological, and critical
inquiries; (4) a legal system is a “closed logical system” in which correct
decisions can be deduced from pre-existing legal rules without reference to
social aims, policies, or moral standards; and (5) ethical noncognitivism (the
claim that moral judgments cannot be established or defended by methods of
rational inquiry as statements of fact can).194 Significantly, Hart neglected to
mention a sixth doctrine, which as an historical matter unites Bentham and
Austin as much any other—that the moral grammar hypothesis is false.195
Hart’s characterizations of natural law are notoriously inadequate, but in addi-
191. See FULLER, supra note 131; WILLIAMS, supra note 189.
192. See H.L.A. Hart, Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1965) (book
review), reprinted in ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 343–64; H.L.A. Hart, Who Can Tell Right from Wrong?,
33 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jul. 17, 1986, at 49 (reviewing BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF
PHILOSOPHY (1985)).
193. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 81–93, 114–25, 157–63 (Wilfrid
E. Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832).
194. See Hart, supra note 1, at 601 n.25; see also HART, supra note 5, at 253 (adding the further
comment that “‘positivism’ is often used [in continental literature] for the general repudiation of the
claim that some principles or rules of human conduct are discoverable by reason alone”). Hart identifies
the same five doctrines in his Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Legal Positivism. See H.L.A. Hart,
Legal Positivism, in 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 418 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967). Note that in
contemporary legal theory, legal positivism is often defined more narrowly, to include only the second
doctrine and a Hartian alternative to the first doctrine. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal
Positivism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241, 241 (Dennis Patterson ed.,
1996) (“All positivists share two central beliefs: first, that what counts as law in any particular society
is fundamentally a matter of social fact or convention (‘the social thesis’); second, that there is no
necessary connection between law and morality (‘the separability thesis’).”); see also Brian Leiter,
Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1140–44 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK,
LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)) (explaining that legal positivism is a theory of
law, not a theory of adjudication, which consists of the social thesis and the separability thesis); accord
Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673,
677–79 (1998). Because of the wide scope of this Essay, unless otherwise indicated I use the term more
broadly than this, to encompass additional doctrines historically associated with legal positivism,
including Bentham’s and Austin’s rejection of the moral grammar hypothesis.
195. See, e.g., AUSTIN, supra note 193, at 81–93; BENTHAM, supra note 67, at 25–28.
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tion to the criticisms John Finnis,196 Norman Kretzmann,197 Mark Murphy,198
and other writers have made, one must add the further objection that Hart
simply ignores many of the classic questions of moral epistemology which
occupied the majority of natural law theorists from Plato onward.
Finally, there is the issue of human rights. It is difficult to imagine a more
direct repudiation of legal positivism than that which is contained in Article 1 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “All human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”199 Here, one
might think, is humanity’s considered response to Anarchical Fallacies and The
Province of Jurisprudence Determined, the sharpest conceivable provocation to
any jurist seeking to build on the positivist legacy of Bentham and Austin. And
yet, surprisingly, Hart hardly seemed to notice or care. None of his rights-
related essays of the 1940s and 1950s—the 1949 paper on rights and responsibili-
ties,200 1953 inaugural lecture,201 1955 paper on natural rights,202 and 1958
paper on legal and moral obligation203—gives the Universal Declaration so
much as a passing reference.204 Meanwhile, the topic of human rights is
196. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 29 (1980) (“H.L.A. Hart has said that
‘natural law theory in all its protean guises attempts to assert that human beings are equally devoted to
and united in their conception of aims (the pursuit of knowledge, justice to their fellow men) other than
that of survival.’ For my part, I know of no one who has ever asserted this.”); id. at 52–53 (“Hart’s
account of ‘the teleological view of nature’ is a little extravagant—of what serious writer was it ever
true that ‘the questions whether [events] do occur regularly and whether they should occur or whether it
is good that they occur [were] not regarded as separate questions’?”) (alteration in original); id. at
364–65 (“The central tradition of natural law theorizing . . . has not chosen to use the slogans attributed
to it by [Hart], for example that ‘what is utterly immoral cannot be law’, or that ‘certain rules cannot be
law because of their moral iniquity’, or that ‘these evil things are not law’, or that ‘nothing iniquitous
can anywhere have the status of law’, or that ‘morally iniquitous demands . . . [are] in no sense
law’ . . . . On the contrary, the tradition, even in its most blunt formulations, has affirmed that unjust
LAWS are not law. Does not this . . . make clear, beyond reasonable question, that the tradition is not
indulging in ‘a refusal, made once and for all, to recognize evil laws as valid for any purpose’?”)
(alteration in original).
197. See Norman Kretzmann, Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex: Laws on Trial in Aquinas’ Court of
Conscience, 33 AM. J. JURIS. 99, 101 n.5 (1988) (explaining that Hart mischaracterizes Augustine and
Aquinas).
198. See Mark Murphy, Natural Law Jurisprudence, 9 LEGAL THEORY 241, 243–44 (2003) (arguing
that the “dominant contemporary understanding of natural law theory,” which is “not drawn from any
reading of natural law theorists themselves, but from Hart,” is deficient in several respects).
199. G.A. Res. 217A (III), supra note 142, art. 1.
200. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, supra note 43.
201. Hart, supra note 52.
202. H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955).
203. H.L.A. Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 82 (A.I. Melden ed.,
1958).
204. Hart later declined to republish three of these essays, although not for this reason. See HART,
supra note 7, at v (explaining that the main claims of The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights “no
longer seem to me defensible”); cf. LACEY, supra note 2, at 146. See also ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 17
(explaining that the main argument of Are There Any Natural Rights? “seems to me to be mistaken and
my errors not sufficiently illuminating to justify re-printing now”); cf. LACEY, supra note 2, at 169.
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completely absent from The Concept of Law.205 In fact, it is not until the late
1970s—three decades after the Universal Declaration was adopted—that the
phrase “human rights” first appears in Hart’s writings.206 We are therefore left
with the following paradox: human rights is “the idea of our time,”207 and yet
the twentieth century’s leading English-language legal philosopher had virtually
nothing to say about them.208
Disappointingly, Lacey does not shed much light on any of these issues.
Although she does a terrific job situating Hart’s intellectual development in the
context of the ordinary language philosophy of the 1940s and early 1950s, her
account of the cross-fertilization that occurred in Hart’s mind between the
philosophy of language and the philosophy of law does not progress much
beyond this point. The contrast Lacey draws between Austin and Wittgen-
stein—in particular her suggestion that Hart would have benefited from taking
“a broader, Wittgensteinian approach”209 to problems of language and meaning—
has proven controversial, with Thomas Nagel holding that “[t]he idea that
Wittgenstein’s method encourages a more empirical approach than Austin’s is
[false],”210 and John Gardner arguing that Lacey is mistaken to assume that
Austin’s influence on Hart was more dominant than Wittgenstein’s.211 However,
this debate leaves untouched the more interesting and fertile question of Hart’s
attitude toward Universal Grammar, next to which the writings of Austin and
Wittgenstein for all their genuine insight seem more like the dead end of a river
than a source of continued inspiration.212
Likewise, Lacey’s account of the debate between natural law and legal
Apparently, Hart also declined to republish Legal and Moral Obligation; however, I am unaware of the
reason for this decision, and Lacey does not address the issue.
205. As far as I can tell, neither “human rights” nor “natural rights” appears in The Concept of Law.
Arguably, Hart does tacitly invoke human rights when discussing the tendency of some natural law
theorists to equate law and morality. See HART, supra note 5, at 7 (explaining that “law and morals
share a vocabulary so that there are both legal and moral obligations, duties, and rights”). However,
none of the book’s further references to rights appear to refer to human rights. See id. at 53–54, 57–58,
85.
206. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Utilitarianism and Natural Rights, 53 TUL. L. REV. 663, 670–71, 678–80
(1979).
207. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, at ix (1990).
208. See also infra notes 217–19 and accompanying text. In his book on Hart, MacCormick remarks
that “Hart has written very extensively about rights.” MACCORMICK, supra note 10, at 88. However, as
MacCormick’s subsequent discussion makes clear, Hart’s efforts in this regard were directed mainly
toward legal rights. Id. at 88–91. Furthermore, as MacCormick points out, Hart’s analysis of the
truth-conditions of “X has a right” in his 1953 inaugural lecture seems to preclude standard uses of
“right” in ordinary moral discourse. Id. at 88–89.
209. LACEY, supra note 2, at 218.
210. Nagel, supra note 15, at 13.
211. Gardner, supra note 2, at 332 (describing Hart’s work as “impeccably late-Wittgensteinian”).
212. Cf. GILBERT RYLE, Review of ‘Symposium on J.L. Austin,’ in 1 COLLECTED PAPERS 272, 273
(1971) (observing that Austin was a “stamp-collector of idioms” who “thought of his own, almost
botanical classifications of locution-types much less as contributions to philosophy than as elements for
a future Principia Grammatica”); Chomsky, supra note 148, at 280 (observing that “[t]here is a curious
frustration in the attempt to explore Wittgenstein’s thought. His examples and remarks, often brilliant
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positivism is also less than edifying. Both of these schools are described as
competing answers to a single question—what is the source of law’s authority?—
their main difference being that one answer (natural law) is inherently religious
or metaphysical, while the other (legal positivism) conceives of law as “essen-
tially human.”213 While this may accurately capture how some legal writers,
such as Justice Holmes,214 have sought to distinguish these schools, such a
description seems little more than a misleading caricature. On any historically
accurate account, what is central to the traditional debate between natural law
and legal positivism is an empirical proposition about the essential properties of
the human mind, which virtually all of the classical natural lawyers affirmed,
but which Bentham and Austin vigorously denied.215 Regrettably, Lacey simply
ignores this issue.
Finally, the information one is able to glean from Lacey’s book on Hart’s
attitude toward human rights is also meager and unsatisfying. We learn that Hart
regularly lectured on rights and duties from 1953 to 1966, but little is said of the
substance of those lectures. Lacey merely observes that they “not only encom-
passed the close analysis of legal concepts but also demonstrated his continued
identification as a philosopher, his persisting interest in moral and political
philosophy, and his belief in the relationship between analytic and normative,
prescriptive strands in philosophy.”216 Lacey does briefly discuss the thesis of
Hart’s 1955 paper, Are There Any Natural Rights?—the conditional argument
“that if there are any moral rights at all, it follows that there is at least one
natural right, the equal right of all men to be free”217—which she generously
describes as “distinctly more radical in 1955 than it would [look] today,”218 but
surely this is a lapse into hagiography. It was not radical, but timid, for Hart to
and perceptive, lead right to the border of the deepest problems, at which point he stops short and
insists that the philosopher can go no further”).
213. See LACEY, supra note 2, at 224 (“Rejecting the ‘natural law’ idea that law derives its authority
from God, or from some metaphysical conception of nature or reason, Bentham and Austin argued that
law is essentially human: it is a command issued by a political superior or sovereign, to whom the
populace is in a habit of obedience.”); see also id. at 4.
214. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The
common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or
quasi-sovereign that can be identified . . . .”). Cf. O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 457, 461 (1897) (“When we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well known
profession . . . . The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, is what
I mean by the law.”).
215. See generally supra notes 168 and 195; see also infra notes 238–39 and accompanying text.
216. See LACEY, supra note 2, at 168–69. According to Honore´,
Hart was never willing to publish his lectures on rights. While he rejected the view of Austin
and Bentham that only law could create rights, he was not satisfied with Mill’s attempt to put
moral rights on a utilitarian foundation and did not see how to provide an alternative. So,
while dismissive of Dworkin’s free-wheeling use of the notion of moral right, he was
uncertain what to substitute.
Honore´, supra note 45, at 303.
217. Hart, supra note 202, at 175.
218. See LACEY, supra note 2, at 169.
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defend this thesis in 1955, seven years after the adoption of the Universal
Declaration, with its notably concrete and expansive list of fundamental human
rights, including freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
(Article 5); freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile (Article 9); the
right to a fair, public, and impartial trial (Article 10); the presumption of
innocence and immunity from retroactive punishment (Article 11); the right to
marry and to found a family (Article 16); freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion (Article 18); freedom of opinion and expression (Article 19); freedom
of peaceful assembly and association (Article 20); the right to just and favorable
working conditions, including a living wage, unemployment benefits, and equal
pay for equal work (Article 23); the right to a standard of living adequate to the
health and well-being of oneself and one’s family (Article 25); the right to
education (Article 26); and the right to participate in the cultural and scientific
life of one’s community (Article 27).219 In light of all this, one is left wondering
whether in spite of, or perhaps even because of, instruments like the Universal
Declaration, with its unmistakable natural law overtones, Hart was simply
skeptical of human rights at the time, as both his early papers and his overall
commitment to legal positivism would seem to imply.
IV.
What explains the puzzle we have uncovered? Why did Hart devote so little
attention to the modern revival of Universal Grammar and the cognitive revolu-
tion it helped inspire? Why did he write so little on the analogy between
grammar and jurisprudence, the moral grammar hypothesis, or the foundation of
human rights? Questions like these are too complex to resolve adequately
here,220 but the following partial and provisional explanation seems plausible. I
offer it here as a tentative hypothesis, with the hope and expectation that others
will modify and improve on it.
Hart’s rise to prominence at Oxford initiated a new phase of legal theory that
shifted the focus of Anglo-American jurisprudence away from historical, doctri-
nal, and empirical inquiries toward analytic philosophy. Although Hart de-
scribed this process as “sell[ing] just a little philosophy to the lawyers,”221 one
of Lacey’s many achievements is to reveal that the converse is also true, that
one of Hart’s primary accomplishments was selling law to the philosophers,
219. Cf. Hart, supra note 202, at 176 (observing that the thesis of his paper “is not as ambitious as
the traditional theories of natural rights” and may appear “meager” in many respects).
220. For example, it is impossible to determine here whether Hart’s unpublished writings might call
into question one or more arguments of this Essay, certainly a distinct possibility that should be kept in
mind. See LACEY, supra note 2, at 145 (“Throughout his career, Herbert wrote vastly more than he
published: he would only release for publication work which satisfied his exceptionally high standards
of rigour, insight, and clarity.”); see also Honore´, supra note 216.
221. See generally LACEY, supra note 2, at 151, 155–78.
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thereby transforming the discipline of analytic philosophy itself.222 The context
in which Hart did so was ordinary language philosophy, a highly insular
movement which was “crying out for someone with insight into the social
practices within which linguistic usage develops.”223 Drawing on his back-
ground as a lawyer, Hart imported a much-needed practical sensibility into this
movement at a time that it risked becoming stale and complacent. He also
exerted a powerful influence on his students and colleagues, including Austin,
which has not always been fully appreciated.224
Hart’s early efforts at applying the techniques of analytic philosophy to
jurisprudence were somewhat shaky, but he hit his stride by the late 1950s. The
books and articles he published during his most productive period, roughly
1957–1964, comprise a truly remarkable body of work, including what may be
the best book on causation and the best short introduction to legal philosophy
ever written. During this period, Hart also became a justly admired public
intellectual, championing gay rights (among other liberal causes) at a time when
such rights were not yet a significant part of public consciousness. His forceful
response to Devlin’s facile attempt to equate the legal suppression of homosexu-
ality with that of treason not only became “the nearest thing to a manifesto for
the homosexual law reform movement,”225 but also constituted a major event in
the development of a liberal democratic culture in Great Britain, Canada, the
United States, and elsewhere.226 It is probably no exaggeration to suggest that a
direct line can be drawn from Hart’s vigorous defense of sexual freedom in
Immorality and Treason and Law, Liberty, and Morality, the latter a true
landmark of political liberalism which grew out of the Hart-Devlin debate, to
cases such as Lawrence v. Texas, which struck down laws criminalizing intimate
homosexual conduct because, inter alia, “the fact that the governing majority in
a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
222. See, e.g., LACEY, supra note 2, at 144–45; accord MACCORMICK, supra note 10, at 16 (Hart
recognized “lawyers’ practices as highly significant for philosophy”); Honore´, supra note 45, at 300
(Hart “introduced to philosophers the legal notion of defeasibility”); Nagel, supra note 15, at 12 (“Hart
was the founder of jurisprudence as a field for analytic philosophy in the second half of the twentieth
century.”); Schauer, supra note 19, at 858 (“Anglo-American analytic philosophy before Hart was not
particularly concerned about law”).
223. LACEY, supra note 2, at 145.
224. See id. (discussing Hart’s influence on Austin’s A Plea for Excuses); MACCORMICK, supra note
10, at 16 (same); Gardner, supra note 2, at 332 (suggesting that “Austin’s ‘theory of speech-acts owed
more to Hart than Hart owed to him’”) (quoting Honore´); cf. H.L.A. Hart, John Langshaw Austin, in
DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 1951–1960, at 46, 47 (E.T. Williams & Helen M. Palmer eds.,
1971) (describing Austin as “the most powerful single influence on the development of philosophy in
Oxford” from 1946 to 1960). Note that Gardner is mistaken to imply that Hart was one of Austin’s
“younger” colleagues, Gardner, supra note 2, at 332, since Austin was born in 1911 and Hart in 1907.
By contrast, Ryle was born in 1900, making him 45 years old when Hart returned to Oxford in 1945 at
the age of 38, while Austin was only 34 at the time.
225. LACEY, supra note 2, at 2, 221.
226. Id.; see also MACCORMICK, supra note 10, at 8–10.
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sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”227 As some
notably repressive post-Lawrence decisions illustrate, Hart’s spirited defense of
liberalism remains pertinent even today.228
By the time Hart accomplished all of this, however, the bulk of his creative
energies had been spent. As Lacey observes, one “cannot disguise a certain
deceleration in Herbert’s intellectual creativity in the second half of the 1960s.”229
This of course is just when Chomsky’s ideas began to attract widespread
attention and the new field of cognitive science began to take hold. By then Hart
was almost sixty years old, and although he remained active for the next several
decades, it seems clear in retrospect that a sustained engagement with a new
paradigm was more effort than Hart could muster. Additionally, there are those
features of Hart’s biography which Lacey brings to our attention: Hart’s training
was classical rather than scientific;230 he was a late returner to philosophy who
was notably insecure about his ability to handle the more technical aspects of
the philosophy of language;231 he came of age intellectually in a highly insular
and homogenous environment, characterized by disdain for the history of
philosophy and the almost cult-like dominance of a few intimidating personali-
ties;232 and finally, throughout his career Hart strongly resisted the idea that
philosophy might become empirical or test its basic assertions about language
and thought experimentally.233 All of these factors help to explain Hart’s failure
to engage productively with the best linguistics and cognitive science of his day.
Hart’s attitude toward the moral grammar hypothesis is more complex, but
many of the same factors seem to be involved. To begin with, Hart’s familiarity
227. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Reasonable
people may differ about whether particular sexual acts are moral or immoral, but ‘we have ample
evidence for believing that people will not abandon morality, will not think any better of murder,
cruelty and dishonesty, merely because some private sexual practice which they abominate is not
punished by the law.’ ”) (quoting Hart, Immorality and Treason, reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW,
supra note 55, at 86).
228. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir.
2004) (denial of reh’g en banc) (upholding FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2002), which provides that “[n]o
person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual”); see also Williams
v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding an Alabama statute prohibiting the
commercial distribution of any device primarily used for the stimulation of human genitals). But see
Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1291 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (arguing that Florida’s ban on homosexual adoption is
unconstitutional because, inter alia, it “condition[s] access to the statutory privilege of adoption on
surrender of the right to engage in private intimate sexual conduct protected by Lawrence”); Williams,
378 F. 3d at 1250 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s decision rests on the erroneous foundation
that there is no substantive due process right to adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home and
erroneously assumes that the promotion of public morality provides a rational basis to criminally
burden such private intimate activity.”).
229. LACEY, supra note 2, at 281, 283, 297, 326.
230. Id. at 136–37.
231. Id. at 115, 143.
232. See id. at 132–36, 138–44.
233. Id. at 260–62.
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with the history of philosophy appears to have been rather limited.234 Most of
the authors he appears to have studied extensively were British empiricists,235
who rejected appeals to innate moral knowledge, often on rather dubious
epistemological grounds.236 Additionally, throughout his career Hart was sur-
rounded by an intellectual culture that was deeply skeptical of appeals to
conscience, the moral sense, the sense of justice, and other allegedly mysterious
entities. Indeed, largely due to their commitment to empiricism, behaviorism,
historicism, or other theoretical doctrines predicated on denying the existence of
innate mental structures, many of the authors Hart read or was influenced by
sought to delegitimize these concepts, or simply rejected them out of hand.237
234. See, e.g., id. at 141–42; see also FINNIS, supra note 196; Kretzmann, supra note 197; Cristobal
Orrego, H.L.A. Hart’s Understanding of Classical Natural Law Theory, 24 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 287,
287 (“Hart misunderstood classical natural law theory in such a way that it warranted the suspicion that
he did not have a first hand acquaintance with that theory”); Twining, supra note 49, at 579 (“Hart has
never claimed to be primarily an historian of ideas.”); cf. H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, 77 LAW Q. REV.
123, 125 (1961) (reviewing DENNIS LLOYD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE: WITH SELECTED TEXTS
(1959)) (expressing surprise “at the amount and difficulty of the philosophy which Professor Lloyd
expects his students to absorb” and explaining “I have never dared to do more overt philosophy than
expound Aristotle on justice, Hobbes and Hume on the nastiness of life without law, and parts of
Aquinas on natural law”).
235. Cf. LACEY, supra note 2, at 141–42 (noting that Oxford linguistic philosophy was characterized
by a process of “casting off the historical, political, and metaphysical baggage of continental traditions
. . . and constructing an indigenous, English, no-nonsense, post-war philosophy . . . . [T]here was a
feeling that much of what had gone before in philosophy was ‘nonsense’: ‘they had won the war, got rid
of the evil people, and didn’t need to learn anything from earlier traditions’.”); id. at 142 (“Only the
so-called English Empiricists—Locke, Berkeley, Hobbes, Hume, and Mill (as well as, to some extent,
Kant)—appear to have engaged the enthusiasm of the linguistic philosophers”).
236. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 188 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Viking Penguin 1985) (1651)
(“Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might
be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that
relate to men in Society, not Solitude.”); JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
65–84 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1689) (rejecting the existence of innate
practical principles because, inter alia, there are no moral principles which command universal assent,
many people violate basic principles without remorse, and no such principles are available to introspec-
tion); JOHN LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE 136–45 (W. von Leyden ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1954) (1660) (same); cf. AUSTIN, supra note 193, at 81–90 (attacking the hypothesis of a moral sense on
these and similar grounds).
237. See, e.g., KURT BAIER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW: A RATIONAL BASIS OF ETHICS 22–23 (1958)
(“The moral sense theory . . . claim[s] that we have a special moral sense . . . which enables us to see
the rightness or wrongness of certain sorts of action. The absolutely fatal objection to this view is that
there is no such moral sense . . . . There is no part of a man’s body whose removal or injury would
specifically affect his knowledge of the rightness or wrongness of certain types or courses of action . . . .”);
R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 77 (Galaxy Book 1964) (1952) (explaining that “our con-
sciences are the product of the principles which our early training has indelibly planted in us” and
therefore an unreliable basis from which to make ethical decisions); MACKIE, supra note 98, at 38–42
(rejecting the existence of a “faculty of moral perception or intuition” because it would be at odds with
empiricist theories of knowledge acquisition, hence epistemologically “queer”); RYLE, supra note 123,
at 315–16 (describing “moral knowledge” as a “strained phrase” and the idea of an innate moral sense
or conscience as a “nursery myth”); JULIUS STONE, HUMAN LAW AND HUMAN JUSTICE 213–16 (1965)
(distancing himself from the sense of justice with scare quotes and arguing that its usefulness as a guide
to moral problems is limited); see also A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND LOGIC 104–09, 108 (1946)
(supplying the classical logical positivist articulation of noncognitivism by holding that “sentences
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Moreover, for most of his life, Hart clung firmly to the belief that legal
positivism and utilitarianism were morally progressive doctrines and that natu-
ral law and common morality were inherently conservative. Indeed, it seems
likely that Hart was inclined to follow Bentham and Austin in assuming that any
appeal to the conscience or moral sense of the community in the context of a
legal or policy dispute was likely to be a mask for ignorance or prejudice.
Austin put the matter thus:
And as for the moral sense, innate practical principles, conscience they are
merely convenient cloaks for ignorance or sinister interest: they mean either
that I hate the law to which I object and cannot tell why, or that I hate the law,
and that the cause of my hatred is one which I find it incommodious to
avow.238
This merely distilled Bentham’s memorable footnote in the second chapter of
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in which Bentham
collected all of the “contrivances” previous British writers had used to reaffirm
the moral grammar hypothesis after Hobbes’ influential attack on it and held
that “[t]he mischief common to all these ways of thinking and arguing (which,
in truth . . . are but one and the same method, couched in different forms of
words) is their serving as a cloak, and pretence, and aliment, to despotism.”239
which simply express moral judgments do not say anything. They are pure expressions of feeling and as
such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood”); SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS 51–70 (Joan Riviere trans., Dover Publications 1994) (1930) (explaining conscience as the
function of a super-ego which originates in the internalization of instinctual aggression); cf. ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 67 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1981) (arguing
that human rights are “fictions” and “belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns”);
WILLIAMS, supra note 189, at 94 (arguing that the hypothesis of a faculty of moral intuition “has been
demolished by a succession of critics, and the ruins of it that remain above ground are not impressive
enough to invite much history of what happened to it”); Richard Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to
Philosophy, in PROSPECTS FOR A COMMON MORALITY 254, 255 (Gene Outka & John P. Reeder, Jr. eds.,
1993) (“Contemporary intellectuals have given up the Enlightenment assumption that religion, myth,
and tradition can be opposed to something ahistorical, something common to all human beings qua
human. . . . The result is to erase the picture of the self common to Greek metaphysics, Christian
theology, and Enlightenment rationalism: the picture of an ahistorical natural center, the locus of human
dignity, surrounded by an adventitious and inessential periphery.”). Rawls was a notable exception to
this pattern. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 95, at 45–52; John Rawls, The Sense of Justice, 72 PHIL. REV.
281 (1963). Hence it is perhaps not surprising that his proposals to organize moral theory around
describing the sense of justice met with such strong resistance.
238. AUSTIN, supra note 193, at 159.
239. BENTHAM, supra note 67, at 28 n.d. Bentham wrote:
It is curious enough to observe the variety of inventions men have hit upon, and the variety of
phrases they have brought forward, in order to conceal from the world, and, if possible, from
themselves, this very general and therefore very pardonable self-sufficiency.
1. One man (Lord Shaftesbury, Hutchinson, Hume, etc.) says, he has a thing made on
purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong; and that it is called a moral sense: and
then he goes to work at his ease, and says, such a thing is right, and such a thing is
wrong—why? ‘because my moral sense tells me it is’.
2. Another man (Dr. Beattie) comes and alters the phrase: leaving out moral, and putting in
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Furthermore, Hart had at least two additional reasons for being skeptical of
hortatory appeals to conscience and common morality. First, the Holocaust:
where was conscience when the most vicious mass murder machine in history
was unleashed on defenseless Jews? Second, his debate with Devlin: why
embrace a “common morality” which apparently lends itself so easily to the
legal enforcement of homophobia?240 Both of these arguments still resonate
common . . . . He then tells you, that his common sense teaches him what is right and wrong,
as surely as the other’s moral sense did: meaning by common sense, a sense of some kind or
other, which, he says, is possessed by all mankind: the sense of those, whose sense is not the
same as the author’s, being struck out of the account as not worth taking. This contrivance
does better than the other; for a moral sense, being a new thing, a man may feel about him a
good while without being able to find it out: but common sense is as old as the creation; and
there is no man but would be ashamed to be thought not to have as much of it as his
neighbours . . . .
3. Another man (Dr. Price) comes, and says, that as to a moral sense indeed, he cannot find
that he has any such thing: that however he has an understanding, which will do quite as well.
This understanding, he says, is the standard of right and wrong: it tells him so and so. All good
and wise men understand as he does: if other men’s understandings differ in any point from
his, so much the worse for them: it is a sure sign they are either defective or corrupt.
4. Another man says, that there is an eternal and immutable Rule of Right: that that rule of
right dictates so and so: and then he begins giving you his sentiments upon anything that
comes uppermost: and these sentiments (you are to take for granted) are so many branches of
the eternal rule of right.
5. Another man (Dr. Clark), or perhaps the same man (it’s no matter) says, that there are
certain practices conformable, and others repugnant, to the Fitness of Things; and then he tells
you, at his leisure, what practices are conformable and what repugnant: just as he happens to
like a practice or dislike it.
6. A great multitude of people are continually talking about the Law of Nature; and then
they go on giving you their sentiments about what is right and what is wrong: and these
sentiments, you are to understand, are so many chapters and sections of the Law of Nature.
7. Instead of the phrase, Law of Nature, you have sometimes, Law of Reason, Right
Reason, Natural Justice, Natural Equity, Good Order. Any of them will do equally well.
. . .
The mischief common to all these ways of thinking and arguing (which, in truth, as we have
seen, are but one and the same method, couched in different forms of words) is their serving
as a cloak, and pretence, and aliment, to despotism: if not a despotism in practice, a despotism
however in disposition: which is but too apt, when pretence and power offer, to show itself in
practice.
Id. at 26 n.d (footnotes omitted).
240. See, e.g., DEVLIN, supra note 55, at 10 (“[S]ociety is not something that is kept together
physically; it is held by the invisible bonds of common thought . . . . A common morality is part of the
bondage.”); id. at 13 (“There is disintegration when no common morality is observed and history shows
that the loosening of moral bonds is often the first stage of disintegration, so that society is justified in
taking the same steps to preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its government and other
essential institutions.”); id. at 15 (equating law with a “‘practical morality’, which is based . . . ‘in the
mass of continuous experience half-consciously or unconsciously accumulated and embodied in the
morality of common sense’”). Recall Hart’s trenchant reply:
For [Devlin] a practice is immoral if the thought of it makes the man on the Clapham omnibus
sick. So be it. Still, why should we not summon all the resources of our reason, sympathetic
understanding, as well as critical intelligence, and insist that before general moral feeling is
turned into criminal law it is submitted to scrutiny of a different kind from Sir Patrick’s?
Surely the legislator should ask whether the general morality is based on ignorance, supersti-
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today, and it is perhaps considerations like these more than anything else that
explains Hart’s decision to align himself with legal positivism just as the seeds
of a global, anti-positivist human rights revolution were being sown. Surely this
is understandable at some level: after the nightmare of the Holocaust, in the face
of so much ongoing racism, sexism, militarism, and homophobia, who is really
prepared to confidently answer Freud’s question: “Homo homini lupus;241 who
has the courage to dispute it in the face of all the evidence in his own life and in
history?”242 Dworkin is probably correct, therefore, that Hart simply despaired
of finding any great truth about human nature that could generate concrete
theories of justice or human rights.243
Hart’s conviction that utilitarianism and legal positivism were morally progres-
sive doctrines and his related discomfort with natural law were clearly major
factors in his approach to The Concept of Law. On this point, a key text which
has not yet received adequate attention (and which Lacey inexplicably ignores)
is Goodhart’s slim but stimulating volume, English Law and the Moral Law.244
Here in a nutshell one finds many of the same ideas for which Hart later became
famous, including the critique of Austin, the variety of laws, the distinction
between being obliged and being obligated, the rule of recognition, the gunman
situation, and others.245 Although one cannot be certain, Hart’s primary objec-
tion, or misunderstanding . . . . To any theory which, like this one, asserts that the criminal law
may be used on the vague ground that the preservation of morality is essential to society and
yet omits to stress the need for critical scrutiny, our reply should be: “Morality, what crimes
may be committed in thy name!”
Hart, Immorality and Treason, supra note 55, at 87.
241. “Man is to man a wolf.” FREUD, supra note 237, at 40.
242. Id.
243. See Ronald Dworkin, Speech at the Memorial Ceremony for Herbert Hart (Feb. 6, 1993),
excerpted in HART, ASK ME NO MORE, supra note 39, at 213, 214.
244. ARTHUR L. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1988)
(1953).
245. See, e.g., id. at 12 (“The attraction of the command theory lies in the fact that it is a not
inaccurate description of the typical English statute. A statute appears to be a command by a superior,
the Queen-in-Parliament, to inferiors, the Queen’s subjects, which will be enforced by a sanction if they
fail to obey it. Even this is true only of penal law where there may be said to be a direct command to
the subject. It is difficult to find a command and a sanction in ordinary civil law. Thus there is no
command addressed to a testator requiring him to make a will in a particular form because he is free to
make a will or not as he chooses.”); id. at 13 (“[T]he moment we go beyond the ordinary civil law we
can see the total inadequacy of this interpretation of law. It leaves out the most important part of State
law, i.e., constitutional law. It is obvious that the corner-stone of the English legal system is the
obedience that is paid to the Queen-in-Parliament, but this cannot have been commanded by anyone.
The structure and the authority of Parliament are based on a collection of ancient and modern rules
which, taken together, constitute the constitution, but they are based on recognition and not on a
non-existent command.”); id. (“The American constitution, which is the most important single legal
document in the history of the world, clearly was not commanded . . . , and it continues to exist not by
force, but by general recognition.”); id. at 19 (“Austin found the key to the science of jurisprudence in
the word command: I suggest that a more correct view is to find it in the word obligation. I should
therefore define law as any rule of human conduct which is recognized as being obligatory. It is
distinguished from a purely voluntary rule of human conduct which is followed for its own sake: thus if
a man always puts on an overcoat in the winter to avoid the cold he is not following this course of
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tive in writing The Concept of Law was probably to produce an accessible
student text which conceded the main criticisms of positivism Goodhart had
made but which denied the conclusions he drew about the dependence of legal
obligation on “an objective moral law.”246 However, while Hart succeeded
brilliantly in this endeavor, his success came at a heavy cost because the
emphasis he placed on the separation of law and morals led him to simplify and
distort the natural law tradition in ways that now seem painfully obvious. It also
led him to evade some difficult conceptual barriers to reconciling legal positiv-
ism with the idea of human rights, such as what to do with the mala in se/mala
prohibita distinction. Human rights and inherent wrongs are opposite sides of a
coin; each implies the other. Yet legal positivists were unwavering in their
rejection of the mala in se/mala prohibita distinction,247 while conservative
jurists like Devlin were quite prepared to draw upon the distinction to support or
at least tolerate the legal regulation of homosexuality and other allegedly
conduct because of any sense of obligation.”); id. at 19–20 (“It is essential to draw a clear distinction
between obedience to an order or a rule and recognition that the order or rule is obligatory, i.e., that the
order or rule ought to be obeyed. We may obey an order solely because we fear that if we do not do so
we shall incur an evil. In such a case we are reacting to naked force, and we shall seek to avoid
obedience if that is possible. We have no conative feeling: no sense that we are under a duty of any
nature. On the other hand, if we recognize that a rule is obligatory our reaction will be entirely
different. It is true that we may refuse to perform our obligation . . . , but nevertheless the feeling of
oughtness will remain.”); id. at 20 (“Let me give you one illustration to make my point. A gangster
enters a bank, and orders, at the point of his gun, all the persons there to raise their hands. A police
constable, who is present, calls on them, as he is entitled to do under the common law, to assist him in
arresting the gangster. Why do we regard the gangster’s order as an arbitrary command and the police
constable’s order as a legal one? The answer obviously does not depend on any sanction, because the
sanction behind the gangster’s order is far more powerful than is any which the law can apply.”).
246. Id. at 30; see, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 121, at 281 (“SUGARMAN: What were the origins of
The Concept of Law? HART: “The essential doctrine is contained in my Harvard lecture. . . . All of a
sudden I felt tremendously antipathetic to rather, as it seemed to me, sentimental views of the
connection between law and morality. Goodhart had it, all sorts of people have it, and it could be given
a natural law basis. And I’ve possibly gone over the deep end too much. I said ‘no separation; they’re
conceptually distinct’, except at various points, which I mention.”) (alteration in original); Hart, supra
note 203, at 89 (linking Goodhart with the view that “at the root of every legal system is a general
recognition of a moral obligation to obey the law so that there is a necessary or analytic connection and
not merely an empirical one between the statement that a legal system exists and the statement that
most of the population recognizes a moral obligation to obey the law” and citing GOODHART, supra note
244, at 18, 28); cf. Morton J. Horwitz, Why is Anglo-American Jurisprudence Unhistorical?, 17 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 551, 581 (1997) (suggesting that the appeal of positivism for secular Jews like Hart and
Kelsen was its serving “as a counterweight to religiously grounded legal systems derived from natural
law”); id. at 582 (“It was precisely his fear of the incorporation of religious norms into positive law that
led Hart to wish to separate law and morality.”).
247. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 52–53 (Anders Weberg trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1945) (1925) (“There are no mala in se, there are only mala prohibita, for a
behavior is malum only if it is prohibitum . . . . These principles are the expression of legal positivism
in the field of criminal law . . . .”); see also AUSTIN, supra note 193, at 92; 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE 264 (Burt Franklin 1970) (1861); BENTHAM, supra note 68, at 28–33, 63–68, 79–89,
374–89; 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, The Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation, in WORKS,
supra note 136, at 171, 192–93; cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952) (drawing on
the mala in se/mala prohibita distinction to read a specific intent element into a federal statute
prohibiting the conversion of government property).
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“immoral” conduct.248 This is the dilemma which, in retrospect, one can see
Hart wrestling with at various times throughout his career, beginning in the
mid-1950s, yet which he arguably never squarely resolved.249 Finally, Hart’s
emphasis on the separation thesis led him to neglect and sometimes distort the
historical record of legal positivism itself, thereby making his jurisprudence
vulnerable to the charge of being unhistorical.250 There are many telling illustra-
tions of this point, such as the fact that Hart never wrote anything about Erie
and its progeny, surely a surprising characteristic of one of the century’s leading
positivists.251 However, nowhere is the unhistorical and politically detached
character of Hart’s jurisprudence more apparent than in his unfortunate ten-
dency to overlook or minimize some rather significant distinctions between
Bentham and Austin.
Bentham was an atheist and a political radical.252 He condemned the corrup-
tion and chicanery of the English bar; waged ceaseless war on irrational
privileges based on sex, wealth, race, and creed; and lit the fire that resulted in
the historic Reform Bill of 1832.253 He was a fierce opponent of slavery,254 a
harsh critic of colonialism,255 and an outspoken if belated proponent of univer-
sal suffrage.256 He conceived of the principle of utility as a rational, secular
measure of right and wrong, and his prodigious philosophical energies were
248. See, e.g., DEVLIN, supra note 55, at 16–18; cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Countless judicial decisions and legislative enactments have relied on the ancient proposi-
tion that a governing majority’s belief that certain sexual behavior is ‘immoral and unacceptable’
constitutes a rational basis for regulation.”); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain
activities not because they harm others but because they are considered, in the traditional phrase,
‘contra bonos mores,’ i.e., immoral.”).
249. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Blackstone’s Use of the Law of Nature, 3 BUTTERWORTHS S. AFR. L. REV.
169 (1956) (examining Blackstone’s use of the mala in se/mala prohibita distinction); Hart, Are There
Any Natural Rights?, supra note 202; Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation, supra note 203, at 83–84
(suggesting that while “duties and obligations are really at home” in the law, the same vocabulary may
be unsuitable in morals); see also HART, supra note 6 (examining the relation between law and morals);
HART, supra note 5, at 181–207 (same); H.L.A. Hart, Duty, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES 320 (David L. Sills ed., 1968) (explaining the concept of duty without reference to natural
duties); Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, supra note 95, at 231–32, 240–41 (expressing concern
over the implications of Rawls’ account of natural duties for sexual freedom and other liberties); Hart,
Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, supra note 55, at 5–13 (analyzing the legal
enforcement of morality in the light of Durkheim’s notion of a “collective conscience”).
250. See generally Horwitz, supra note 246; see also TWINING, supra note 176, at 47–49.
251. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938) (drawing on a positivist conception of
law to deny the existence of federal general common law). But see Goldsmith and Walt, supra note 194
(challenging the conventional wisdom that Erie relies on a commitment to legal positivism).
252. See generally ELIE HALEVY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALISM (1955); James E.
Crimmins, Bentham on Religion: Atheism and the Secular Society, 47 J. HIST. IDEAS 95 (1986).
253. On Bentham’s life and influence, see generally HALEVY, supra note 252; MARY P. MACK, JEREMY
BENTHAM: AN ODYSSEY OF IDEAS, 1748–1792 (1962); JOHN STUART MILL, BENTHAM (1838), reprinted in
MILL ON BENTHAM AND COLERIDGE 39 (F.R. Leavis ed., 1983). On Bentham’s jurisprudence, see
generally GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1986).
254. See, e.g., HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 70, at 72–73.
255. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, Emancipate Your Colonies!, in 4 WORKS, supra note 136, at 408.
256. See, e.g., HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 70, at 70.
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undoubtedly directed toward the genuine improvement of human welfare. For
example, when Bentham wrote of those “whose care it has been to pluck the
mask of Mystery from the face of Jurisprudence,”257 he was not referring to
something abstruse or theoretical, but simple and practical: parliamentary re-
forms requiring courts of law to record their proceedings in English rather than
Law-Latin, so that the public, whose liberties were at stake, could actually
understand them.258
By contrast, Austin was a religious and political conservative whose opposi-
tion to liberalism earned him a reputation as “a retrograde or backsliding
257. BENTHAM, supra note 68, at 410.
258. Id. In one of his many trenchant criticisms of Blackstone, Bentham wrote:
It is from the decisions of Courts of Justice that those rules of Law are framed, on the
knowledge of which depend the life, the fortune, the liberty of every man in the nation. Of
these decisions the Records are, according to our Author [i.e., Blackstone] (I Comm. 71) the
most authentic histories. These Records were, till within these five-and-forty years, in
Law-Latin: a language which, upon a high computation, about one man in a thousand used to
fancy himself to understand. In this Law-Latin it is that our Author is satisfied they should
have been continued . . . . He gives us to understand that, taking it altogether, there could be
no room to complain of it, seeing it was not more unintelligible than the jargon of the
schoolmen, some passages of which he instances; and then he goes on, “This technical Latin
continued in use from the time of its first introduction till the subversion of our ancient
constitution under Cromwell; when, among many other innovations on the body of the Law,
some for the better and some for the worse, the language of our Records was altered and
turned into English. But at the Restoration of King Charles, this novelty was no longer
countenanced; the practisers finding it very difficult to express themselves so concisely or
significantly in any other language but the Latin. And thus it continued without any sensible
inconvenience till about the year 1730, when it was again thought proper that the Proceedings
at Law should be done into English, and it was accordingly so ordered by statute 4 Geo. II. c.
26.
“This was done (continues our Author) in order that the common people might have
knowledge and understanding of what was alleged or done for and against them in the process
and pleadings, the judgment and entries in a cause. Which purpose I know not how well it has
answered; but am apt to suspect that the people are now, after many years’ experience,
altogether as ignorant in matters of law as before.”
In this scornful passage the words novelty—done into English—apt to suspect—altogether
as ignorant—sufficiently speak the affection of the mind that dictated it. It is thus that our
Author chuckles over the supposed defeat of the Legislature with a fond exultation which all
his discretion could not persuade him to suppress.
The case is this. A large portion of the body of the Law was, by the bigotry or the artifice of
Lawyers, locked up in an illegible character, and in a foreign tongue. The statute he mentions
obliged them to give up their hieroglyphics, and to restore the native language to its rights.
This was doing much; but it was not doing every thing. Fiction, tautology, technicality,
circuity, irregularity, inconsistency remain. But above all the pestilential breath of Fiction
poisons the sense of every instrument it comes near.
The consequence is, that the Law, and especially that part of it which comes under the topic
of Procedure, still wants much of being generally intelligible. The fault then of the Legislature
is their not having done enough. His quarrel with them is for having done any thing at all. In
doing what they did, they set up a light, which, obscured by remaining clouds, is still but too
apt to prove an ignis fatuus: our Author, instead of calling for those clouds to be removed,
deprecates all light, and pleads for total darkness.
Id. at 410–11 n.r (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *322).
772 [Vol. 95:733THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
Benthamite.”259 He did not think the principle of utility was the basis of a
secular morality, but rather “the index to God’s commands.”260 He was luke-
warm on the abolition of slavery,261 an apologist for British colonialism,262 and
an opponent of universal suffrage on the grounds that “the bulk of the working
people are not yet ready for political power.”263 While Austin supported some
progressive reforms in his youth, by 1859 he stated publicly what he had told
his friends in private many years earlier: that democracy was not only unneces-
sary, but also undesirable, because the natural opinions of most working people
were essentially socialist.264
When Hart, therefore, described Bentham and Austin as “the vanguard of a
movement which laboured with passionate intensity and much success to bring
about a better society and better laws”265 and praised them for standing firmly
“for all the principles of liberalism in law and government”;266 when he
credited them with “the most enlightened liberal attitudes”267 and claimed that
their emphasis on the separation of law and morality was motivated mainly by
“the problem posed by the existence of morally evil laws”;268 and when he
insisted that the “the great battle-cries of legal positivism”269 were therefore
directed toward empowering rather than weakening the ability of individuals to
criticize and resist the abuse of official power; his statements were largely
accurate with respect to Bentham but quite dubious with respect to Austin.
(Considering what Austin actually does in connection with the separation thesis
in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, among his main objectives was
to delegitimize the law of nations, hardly a progressive doctrine either in his day
259. W.L. MORRISON, JOHN AUSTIN 42 (1982).
260. AUSTIN, supra note 193, at 69; see also id. at 41 (describing “the principle of general utility” as
“our only index or guide to [God’s] unrevealed law”).
261. See MORRISON, supra note 259, at 122.
262. See WILFRID E. RUMBLE, THE THOUGHT OF JOHN AUSTIN 51 (1985).
263. JOHN AUSTIN, A PLEA FOR THE CONSTITUTION, at vi (London, John Murray 1859).
264. MORRISON, supra note 259, at 123. Austin wrote:
No man, looking attentively at the realities around him, can doubt that a great majority of the
working classes are imbued with principles essentially socialist: that their very natural
opinions on political and economic subjects are partial applications of the premises which are
the groundwork of the socialist theories. They believe, for example, very generally, that the
rate of wages depends on the will of the employers; that the prices of provisions and other
articles of general consumption, depend upon the will of the sellers; that the wealth of the
richer classes is somehow subtracted from their own; and that capital is not an adminicle, but
an antagonist of labour. We might, therefore, expect from a House of Commons representing
the prejudices of the non-proprietary class, a minimum rate of wages, a maximum price of
provisions and other necessaries of life, with numberless other restrictions on the actual
freedom of contracting.
AUSTIN, supra note 263, at 19.
265. Hart, supra note 1, at 52.
266. Id. at 51.
267. Id. at 74.
268. Id. at 73.
269. HART, supra note 5, at 203.
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or ours.) Likewise, when Lacey credits the positivism on which Hart built with
“the development of a conception of law appropriate to modern, secular democ-
racies,”270 her contention merits careful scrutiny. There is little question that
modern secular democracies are predicated on the fundamental moral equality
and dignity of all individuals; on popular sovereignty; on the rule of law (“the
government of law and not of men”); and, above all, on the concept of human
rights. How, if at all, ideas like these can be brought together in one coherent
scheme is of course controversial, but as an historical matter, they unquestion-
ably owe more to the philosophy of natural law than to legal positivism.271 By
contrast, the legal positivism Hart inherited and sought to revitalize included
(along with many attractive features) the following elements: no acts are wrong
in themselves; conscience and human rights are mere fictions; international law
is not really law; all law emanates from a determinate sovereign, whose power
is incapable of legal limitation. Hart chipped away at many of these notions,272
but he never subjected the epistemological foundations of positivism to whole-
sale critical scrutiny, even after the cognitive and human rights revolutions
provided him with powerful reasons to do so. Nor, as far as one can tell, did he
seriously question whether the same philosophical doctrines which for Bentham
had been a key to progressive social reform had become in his own day, under
different circumstances, a legal theory for judicial conservatives.273
270. LACEY, supra note 2, at 4, 224.
271. Cf. GOODHART, supra note 244, at 10–28 (arguing that Austin’s positivism is incompatible with
the rule of law); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 88–92 (Raymond Firth ed., Beacon Press 1963)
(1861) (discussing the natural law origins of modern democratic ideas); FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN
THE LAW 31–79, 32 (1922) (tracing the “essentially rationalist and progressive” history of natural law
doctrines from Aristotle onward, including their impact on English legal norms of reasonableness,
justice, and equity); see also Dyzenhaus, supra note 31, at 119–20 (arguing that “in the last sixty years
both international and domestic law have been shaped more by Professor’s Radbruch’s intuitions than
by Professor Hart’s”); Schauer, supra note 19, at 865 (noting that lawyers refer to the rule of law in
ways that owe far more to Fuller than to Hart).
272. See, e.g., HART, supra note 5, at 64–69 (criticizing the positivist concept of a legally unlimited
sovereign); id. at 189–95 (rejecting the positivist thesis that “law may have any content” in favor of “a
minimum content of natural law”); id. at 208–31 (affirming the obligatory character of international
law).
273. For some illuminating discussion of this topic, see generally ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL
POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998) (tracing the association of positivism and conservatism in
post-war American jurisprudence); Horwitz, supra note 246 (describing the shifting political signifi-
cance of legal positivism in English jurisprudence from Bentham to Hart); see also Ronald Dworkin,
Thirty Years On, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1677–78 (2002) (noting that while jurists like Bentham,
Holmes, Hand, and Brandeis appealed to positivism to support progressive economic and social
legislation, after World War II positivism “was associated no longer with democratic progress, but with
conservative majoritarianism”). Dworkin claims that positivism “is no longer an important force either
in legal practice or in legal education,” id. at 1677, but among other things this contention seems at
odds with the Supreme Court’s recent habeas corpus, qualified immunity, and law of nations jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1746–53, 1758–64 (1991) (analyzing the positivist
underpinnings of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (habeas corpus), and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity)); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–38 (2004)
(relying on a positivist conception of law to limit the jurisdictional reach of the Alien Tort Statute, 28
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Near the end of his career, Hart’s attitudes began to shift, and he began to
voice greater misgivings about Bentham’s philosophical doctrines and to devote
more attention to the foundation of human rights. In one of his last essays, he
wrote movingly of the growth of a global human rights culture and of the
importance of finding sound philosophical arguments in support of it. Surveying
the efforts of Rawls, Nozick, and Dworkin to construct such a theory, Hart
found them to be “in spite of much brilliance still unconvincing,”274 and he
called for a “more radical and detailed consideration”275 of the basis of human
rights and their relation to other values. Hart wrote:
[I]t is plain that a theory of rights is urgently called for. During the last half
century man’s inhumanity to man has been such that the most basic and
elementary freedoms and protections have been denied to innumerable men
and women guilty, if of anything, only of claiming such freedoms and
protections for themselves and others, and sometimes these have been denied
to them on the specious pretence that they are demanded by the general
welfare of society. So the protection of a doctrine of basic human rights
limiting what a state may do to its citizens seems to be precisely what the
political problems of our own age most urgently require . . . . And in fact the
philosophical developments which I have sketched have been accompanied
by a growth, recently accelerated, of an international human rights movement.
Since 1946 when the signatories of the United Nations Charter affirmed their
faith in fundamental human rights and the dignity and worth of the human
person, no state can claim that the denial of such rights to its own citizens is
solely its own business . . . . [T]he conception of basic human rights has
deeply affected the style of diplomacy, the morality and the political ideology
of our time, even though thousands of innocent persons still imprisoned or
oppressed have not yet felt its benefits. The doctrine of human rights has at
least temporarily replaced the doctrine of maximising Utilitarianism as the
prime philosophical inspiration of political and social reform. It remains to be
seen whether it will have as much success as Utilitarianism once had in
changing the practices of governments for human good.276
Hart’s eloquent remarks in this passage serve as an important reminder of
U.S.C. § 1350); id. at 745–46 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that “a new federal common law of
international human rights” should be completely foreclosed because “the creation of post-Erie federal
common law is rooted in a positivist mindset utterly foreign to the American common-law tradition of
the late 18th century”). Of course, none of these observations should be taken to imply that positivism
is inherently conservative, for depending on how it is defined, positivism may have few if any political
implications. See generally Hart, supra note 1; cf. supra note 194. Nor do they imply that natural law
doctrines are “essentially rationalist and progressive.” POLLOCK, supra note 271 (emphasis added).
“ ‘Like a harlot, natural law is at the disposal of everyone. The ideology does not exist that cannot be
defended by an appeal to the law of nature.’ ” H.L.A. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, in ESSAYS, supra
note 1, at 163 (quoting ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE (1958)).
274. Hart, supra note 206, at 679.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 679–80.
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difficult political and legal challenges which have not yet been met. Yet they
also remind us of some crucial limitations of Hart’s own approach to human
rights, which he never managed to transcend over the course of his illustrious
career. Here and elsewhere, Hart’s philosophy of human rights is restricted to
the activities of a state concerning the civil and political rights of its citizens.
Significantly, Hart never broadened this conception to encompass human rights
abuses committed by private actors, such as corporations; the full status of
social, economic, and cultural rights, such as those rights enumerated in Articles
22–27 of the Universal Declaration; or the human rights of persons generally,
including aliens, refugees, indigenous peoples, and individuals living under
military occupation. Today, these categories comprise many of the world’s most
pressing human rights challenges. Moreover, it seems clear on reflection that
even after Rawls had called for a return to “the conception of [moral philoso-
phy] adopted by most classical British writers through Sidgwick,”277 Hart never
seriously entertained the possibility that the foundation of human rights could
be found where most classical British as well as American writers said it could
be found: in a moral sense or conscience “which nature has made universal in
the whole species.”278 Instead, even in his later essays, Hart continued to
approach the topic of human rights almost entirely in the shadow of Bentham’s
epistemological empiricism279—even as he perceptively criticized Nozick and
277. RAWLS, supra note 95, at 51.
278. HUME, supra note 168, at 6; see also id. at 5 (locating the seat of moral judgment in “the
original fabric and formation of the human mind”); JOSEPH BUTLER, A Dissertation on the Nature of
Virtue, in FIVE SERMONS 69, 69 (Stephen L. Darwall ed., 1983) (recognizing a universal moral faculty in
“our natural sense of gratitude . . . [the] distinction every one makes between injury and mere harm . . .
and [the distinction] between injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior to the
consideration of human laws,” and remarking that a “great part of common language, and of common
behavior over the world, is formed upon supposition of such a moral faculty”); FRANCIS HUTCHESON, A
SHORT INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1747), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 155, 161 (R.S.
Downie ed., 1994) (observing that the “several rights of mankind” derive “from that moral sense of
right and wrong, natural to us previous to any consideration of law or command”); SMITH, supra note
173, at 318 (explaining that in order to refute the “odious” doctrine of Hobbes, “it was necessary to
prove, that antecedent to all law or positive institution, the mind was naturally endowed with a faculty,
by which it distinguished in certain actions and affections, the qualities of right, laudable, and virtuous,
and in others those of wrong, blamable, and vicious”); MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE
RIGHTS OF WOMAN (1792), reprinted in A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MEN AND A VINDICATION OF THE
RIGHTS OF WOMAN 65, 75, 69 (Sylvana Tomaselli ed., 1995) (observing that women must be viewed “in
the grand light of human creatures, who, in common with men, are placed on this earth to unfold their
faculties,” and demanding “a participation of the natural rights of mankind” on this basis); cf.
JEFFERSON, supra note 168; WILSON, supra note 168.
279. See Etienne Dumont, Introduction to Principles of the Civil Code, reprinted in 1 WORKS, supra
note 136, at 299, 300 (“The first ray of light which broke in upon Mr. Bentham in his legal studies was,
that the law of Nature—the original Compact—the moral Sense—the notions of Right and Wrong,
which had been employed for the explanation of the laws, were only at bottom those innate ideas
whose falsehood had been so ably demonstrated by Mr. Locke.”). Compare John Stuart Mill:
Man is conceived by Bentham as being susceptible of pleasures and pains, and governed in all
his conduct partly by the different modifications of self-interest, and the passions commonly
classed as selfish, partly by sympathies, or occasionally antipathies, towards other beings. And
here Bentham’s conception of human nature stops . . . . Man is never recognized by him as a
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Dworkin of operating too much in the shadow of utilitarianism.280
Finally, as scholars continue to debate Hart’s legacy and to contemplate new
forms of jurisprudence in an era increasingly characterized by naturalism and
globalization,281 it seems important to ask whether Hart ever considered that the
proper philosophical standpoint from which to interpret Bentham’s theory of
fictions, of which his critique of natural rights was in some sense merely an
application, is the computational and internalist theory of language and mind
pioneered by Chomsky and other linguists and philosophers in the 1960s and
1970s and now widely utilized in the cognitive and brain sciences.282 From this
naturalistic perspective, human rights are indeed “fictions” in more or less
Bentham’s sense—mental constructs which are indispensable for human thought
and discourse, but which have no immediate referent in the mind-independent,
external world, as described by the natural sciences—but are surely no worse
off for that; for the same may be said of many if not most concepts of folk
psychology and ordinary discourse, and the principles which generate these
rights are, or at least can be, as much a part of a scientific theory of human
nature as other principles of cognitive science are. Furthermore, while the
existence and character of these principles is, or least can be, a problem of
ordinary science, the discipline which studies them may justly be called “jurispru-
dence” as much as anything else. For it is a matter of no small importance to
recognize that for centuries before positivism sought to redefine its subject
matter, the science of jurisprudence was directed toward elucidating “the com-
being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an end; of desiring, for its own sake, the
conformity of his own character to his standard of excellence, without the hope of good or
fear of evil from other source than his own inward consciousness. Even in the more limited
form of Conscience, this great fact of human nature escapes him. Nothing is more curious
than the absence of recognition in any of his writings of the existence of conscience, as a thing
distinct from philanthropy, from affection for God or man, and from self-interest in this world
or the next. There is a studied abstinence from any of the phrases which, in the mouths of
others, import the acknowledgment of such a fact.
MILL supra note 253, at 66–67; cf. BENTHAM, supra note 67.
280. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, The United States of America, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 70, at
53 (examining the doctrine of natural rights from the perspective of Bentham’s criticisms of it); H.L.A.
HART, Natural Rights: Bentham and John Stuart Mill, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 70, at 79
(same); Hart, 1776–1976, supra note 96 (same); Hart, Utilitarianism and Natural Rights, supra note
206 (same); Hart, Between Utility and Rights, supra note 90 (same); cf. id. at 222 (suggesting that “a
satisfactory foundation for a theory of rights will [not] be found as long as the search is conducted in
the shadow of utilitarianism, as both Nozick’s and Dworkin’s in their different ways are”).
281. See generally BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW
AND SOCIETY (2001); TWINING, supra note 250; William Twining, General Jurisprudence, in LAW AND
JUSTICE IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY 609 (M. Escamilla & M. Saavedra eds., 2005).
282. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT (1993); NOAM CHOMSKY, NEW HORIZONS
IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE AND MIND (2000); JERRY A. FODOR, THE LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT (1975);
GARDNER, supra note 33; JACKENDOFF, supra note 149; RAY JACKENDOFF, LANGUAGES OF THE MIND:
ESSAYS ON MENTAL REPRESENTATION (1992); STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS (1997).
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monsense morality of the human race”283 with the aid of a technical legal
vocabulary, in roughly the manner many philosophers and cognitive scientists
now do: by identifying a class of considered judgments in which “our moral
capacities are most likely to be displayed without distortion”284 and a set of
rules and principles from which they can be derived. The historical evidence for
this proposition is hardly unequivocal, but nonetheless it seems reasonably
clear.285 Hence a careful study of classical accounts of jurisprudence from a
contemporary scientific perspective may prove to be a highly profitable enter-
prise for philosophers, legal theorists, and cognitive scientists alike. With the
dramatic success of Universal Grammar in the past fifty years, it is perhaps not
too much to hope that a revitalized conception of Universal Jurisprudence,
conceived along similar lines, may also make significant progress in the years
that lie ahead, thereby supplying an increasingly globalized yet fractured world
with a deeper and more durable understanding of universal human rights.
283. J.B. Schneewind, Hugo Grotius, in 1 MORAL PHILOSOPHY FROM MONTAIGNE TO KANT: AN
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 173, at 88, 88.
284. RAWLS, supra note 95, at 47.
285. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 95, at 50–51, 51 n.26 (characterizing a theory of justice as “a
theory of the moral sentiments . . . setting out the principles governing our moral powers, or, more
specifically, our sense of justice” and equating this endeavor with both “the conception of [moral
philosophy] adopted by most classical British writers through Sidgwick” and “Aristotle’s procedure in
the Nicomachean Ethics”); id. at 51 (stating that under this conception of moral philosophy “[t]here is a
definite if limited class of facts against which conjectured principles can be checked, namely, our
considered judgments in reflective equilibrium”); HENRY SIDGWICK, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ETHICS
160–61 (Hacket Publ’g 5th ed. 1988) (1902) (observing an “absence of distinction between the
provinces of Ethics and Jurisprudence” in the history of moral philosophy prior to Grotius, which
Grotius only partially abandoned); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 373–74 (Hacket Publ’g
1981) (1874) (characterizing the history of moral philosophy as a series of attempts to formulate
principles “by the scientific application of which the common moral thought of mankind may be at
once systematized and corrected”). See generally POTTS, supra note 168 (discussing medieval theories
of conscience); J.B. SCHNEEWIND, SIDGWICK’S ETHICS AND VICTORIAN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (tracing the
history of British moral philosophy from Thomas Reid to Henry Sidgwick, F.H. Bradley, and T.H.
Green); J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
(1998) (tracing the history of modern moral philosophy from Montaigne to Kant); BRIAN TIERNEY, THE
IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW, AND CHURCH LAW, 1150–1625
(William B. Eerdmans Publ’g 2001) (1997) (examining rights in the context of medieval and early
modern jurisprudence); RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES (1979) (same). Cf. J. INST. 1.1.1 (J.B.
Moyle ed., 1928) (defining jurisprudence to include “the science of the just and the unjust”); HENRY DE
BRACTON, 2 DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE [ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND] 25
(George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (1268) (same); GROTIUS,
supra note 168, Prolegomena, at 30 (noting that the proper study of jurisprudence is natural law and
observing: “Many, in preceding times, have designed to invest [jurisprudence] with the form of an Art
or Science; but no one has done this. Nor can it be done, except care be taken in that point which has
never yet been properly attended to;—to separate Instituted Law from Natural Law.”); ADAM SMITH,
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 397 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1766) (“Jurispru-
dence is that science which inquires into the general principles which ought to be the foundation of the
laws of all nations.”). But see AUSTIN, supra note 193, at 18 (“The matter of jurisprudence is positive
law: law, simply and strictly so called: or law set by political superiors to political inferiors.”).
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CONCLUSION
A Life of H.L.A. Hart is a compelling story of an admirable man who had a
profound impact on twentieth century philosophy of law. With style and grace,
Nicola Lacey unmasks the man behind the initials, weaving a complex and
engaging narrative which illuminates many aspects of Hart’s life and career by
locating them in their original social and philosophical context. The result is a
truly impressive biography that is sure to become a standard reference for many
years to come.
As Frederick Schauer observes, one of the many virtues of Lacey’s book is
that it “tracks what actually interested Hart,”286 thereby enabling scholars to
take a fresh look at elements of his legal philosophy that have become hidden or
obscured as a result of the massive literature it has spawned. Further, by paying
Hart’s work the ultimate compliment of unflinching criticism, Lacey encourages
the rest of us to ask some hard questions of our own. This Essay seeks to build
on these foundations by drawing attention to some notable gaps in Hart’s
jurisprudence and Lacey’s interpretation of it that have not yet received ad-
equate attention. It is to be hoped that these efforts will encourage others to
improve on them.
286. Schauer, supra note 19, at 869.
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